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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge:  
 Betting on sports is an activity that has unarguably 
increased in popularity over the last several decades.  Seeking 
to address instances of illegal sports wagering within its 
borders and to improve its economy, the State of New Jersey 
has sought to license gambling on certain professional and 
amateur sporting events.  A conglomerate of sports leagues, 
displeased at the prospect of State-licensed gambling on their 
athletic contests, has sued to halt these efforts.  They contend, 
alongside the United States as intervening plaintiff, that New 
Jersey’s proposed law violates a federal law that prohibits 
most states from licensing sports gambling, the Professional 
and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992 (PASPA), 28 
U.S.C. § 3701 et seq. 
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 In defense of its own sports wagering law, New Jersey 
counters that the leagues lack standing to bring this case 
because they suffer no injury from the State’s legalization of 
wagering on the outcomes of their games.  In addition, 
alongside certain intervening defendants, New Jersey argues 
that PASPA is beyond Congress’ Commerce Clause powers 
to enact and that it violates two important principles that 
underlie our system of dual state and federal sovereignty: one 
known as the “anti-commandeering” doctrine, on the ground 
that PASPA impermissibly prohibits the states from enacting 
legislation to license sports gambling; the other known as the 
“equal sovereignty” principle, in that PASPA permits Nevada 
to license widespread sports gambling while banning other 
states from doing so.  The District Court disagreed with each 
of these contentions, granted summary judgment to the 
leagues, and enjoined New Jersey from licensing sports 
betting. 
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On appeal, we conclude that the leagues have Article 
III standing to enforce PASPA and that PASPA is 
constitutional.  As will be made clear, accepting New Jersey’s 
arguments on the merits would require us to take several 
extraordinary steps, including: invalidating for the first time 
in our Circuit’s jurisprudence a law under the anti-
commandeering principle, a move even the United States 
Supreme Court has only twice made; expanding that principle 
to suspend commonplace operations of the Supremacy Clause 
over state activity contrary to federal laws; and making it 
harder for Congress to enact laws pursuant to the Commerce 
Clause if such laws affect some states differently than others.   
We are cognizant that certain questions related to this 
case—whether gambling on sporting events is harmful to the 
games’ integrity and whether states should be permitted to 
license and profit from the activity—engender strong views.  
But we are not asked to judge the wisdom of PASPA or of 
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New Jersey’s law, or of the desirability of the activities they 
seek to regulate.  We speak only to the legality of these 
measures as a matter of constitutional law.  Although this 
“case is made difficult by [Appellants’] strong arguments” in 
support of New Jersey’s law as a policy matter, see Gonzales 
v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005), our duty is to “say what the 
law is,” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803).  “If 
two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on 
the operation of each.”  Id.  New Jersey’s sports wagering law 
conflicts with PASPA and, under our Constitution, must 
yield.  We will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
 I.  LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 Wagering on sporting events is an activity almost as 
inscribed in our society as participating in or watching the 
sports themselves.  New Jersey tells us that sports betting in 
the United States—most of it illegal—is a $500 billion dollar 
per year industry.  And scandals involving the rigging of 
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sporting contests in the interest of winning a wager are as old 
as the games themselves: the infamous Black Sox scandal of 
the 1919 World Series, or Major League Baseball’s (“MLB”) 
lifetime ban on all-time hits leader Pete Rose for allegedly 
wagering on games he played in come to mind.  And the 
recent prosecution of Tim Donaghy, a National Basketball 
Association (“NBA”) referee who bet on games that he 
officiated, reminds us of problems that may stem from 
gambling. 
However, despite its pervasiveness, few states have 
ever licensed gambling on sporting events.  Nevada alone 
began permitting widespread betting on sporting events in 
1949 and just three other states—Delaware, Oregon, and 
Montana—have on occasion permitted limited types of 
lotteries tied to the outcome of sporting events, but never 
single-game betting.  Sports wagering in all forms, 
particularly State-licensed wagering, is and has been illegal 
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elsewhere.  See, e.g., 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5513; Del. 
Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1401, et seq.  Congress took up and 
eventually enacted PASPA in 1992 in response to increased 
efforts by states to begin licensing the practice. 
A. The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection 
Act of 1992 
PASPA’s key provision applies for the most part 
identically to “States” and “persons,” providing that neither 
may  
sponsor, operate, advertise, or promote . . . a 
lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, 
or wagering scheme based directly or indirectly 
(through the use of geographical references or 
otherwise), on one or more competitive games 
in which amateur or professional athletes 
participate, or are intended to participate, or on 
one or more performances of such athletes in 
such games. 
28 U.S.C. § 3702.  The prohibition on private persons is 
limited to any such activity conducted “pursuant to the law or 
compact of a governmental entity,” id. § 3702(2), while the 
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states are subject to an additional restriction: they may not 
“license[] or authorize by law or compact” any such gambling 
activities, id. §§ 3702(1), 3701. 
PASPA contains three relevant exceptions—a 
“grandfathering” clause that releases Nevada from PASPA’s 
grip, see id. § 3704(a)(2), a clause that permitted New Jersey 
to license sports wagering in Atlantic City had it chosen to do 
so within one year of PASPA’s enactment, see id. 
§ 3704(a)(3), and a grandfathering provision permitting states 
like Delaware and Oregon to continue the limited “sports 
lotteries” that they had previously conducted, see id. 
§ 3704(a)(1).  PASPA provides for a private right of action 
“to enjoin a violation [of the law] . . . by the Attorney General 
or by a . . . sports organization . . . whose competitive game is 
alleged to be the basis of such violation.”  Id. § 3703. 
Only one Court of Appeals has decided a case under 
PASPA—ours.  In Office of the Commissioner of Baseball v. 
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Markell we held that PASPA did not permit Delaware to 
license single-game betting because the relevant 
grandfathering provision for Delaware permitted only 
lotteries consisting of multi-game parlays on NFL teams.  579 
F.3d 293, 304 (3d Cir. 2009).  This is the first case addressing 
PASPA’s constitutionality. 
The Act’s legislative history is sparse but mostly 
consistent with the foregoing.   The Report of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee makes clear that PASPA’s purpose is to 
“prohibit sports gambling conducted by, or authorized under 
the law of, any State or governmental entity” and to “stop the 
spread of State-sponsored sports gambling.”  Sen. Rep. 102-
248, at 4, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3553, 3555 
(“Senate Report”).  The Senate Report specifically notes 
legislators’ concern with “State-sponsored” and “State-
sanctioned” sports gambling.  Id. at 3555. 
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The Senate Report catalogues what the Committee 
believed were some of the problems arising from sports 
gambling.  Importantly, the Committee noted its concern for 
“the integrity of, and public confidence in, amateur and 
professional sports” and its concern that “[w]idespread 
legalization of sports gambling would inevitably promote 
suspicion about controversial plays and lead fans to think ‘the 
fix was in’ whenever their team failed to beat the point-
spread.”  Id. at 3556.  The Senate Report also stated its 
concurrence with the then-director of New Jersey’s Division 
of Gaming Enforcement’s statement that “most law 
enforcement professionals agree that legalization has a 
negligible impact on, and in some ways enhances, illegal 
markets.”  Id. at 3558.  This is so because “many new 
gamblers will . . . inevitably . . . seek to move beyond lotteries 
to wagers with higher stakes and more serious consequences.”  
Id. 
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The Senate Report also explains the Committee’s 
conclusion that “[s]ports gambling is a national problem” 
because “[t]he moral erosion it produces cannot be limited 
geographically” given the thousands who earn a livelihood 
from professional sports and the millions who are fans of 
them, and because “[o]nce a State legalizes sports gambling, 
it will be extremely difficult for other States to resist the 
lure.”  Id. at 3556.  Finally, it notes that PASPA exempts 
Nevada because the Committee did not wish to “threaten 
[Nevada’s] economy,” or of the three other states that had 
chosen in the past to enact limited forms of sports gambling.  
Id. at 3559. 
B. Sports Gambling in New Jersey Since PASPA Was 
Enacted 
Although New Jersey in its discretion chose not to 
avail itself of PASPA’s exemption within the one-year 
window, “[o]ver the course of the next two decades . . . the 
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views of the New Jersey voters regarding sports wagering 
evolved.”  Br. of Appellants Sweeney, et al. 4.  In 2010, the 
New Jersey Legislature held public hearings during which it 
heard testimony that regulated sports gambling would 
generate much-needed revenues for the State’s casinos and 
racetracks, and during which legislators expressed a desire to 
“to stanch the sports-wagering black market flourishing 
within [New Jersey’s] borders.”  Br. of Appellants Christie, et 
al. 13 (“N.J. Br.”).  The Legislature ultimately decided to 
hold a referendum which would result in an amendment to the 
State’s Constitution permitting the Legislature to “authorize 
by law wagering. . . on the results of any professional, 
college, or amateur sport or athletic event.”  N.J. Const. Art. 
IV, § VII, ¶ 2 (D), (F).  The measure was approved by the 
voters, and the Legislature later enacted the law that is now 
asserted to be in violation of PASPA—the “Sports Wagering 
Law,” which permits State authorities to license sports 
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gambling in casinos and racetracks and casinos to operate 
“sports pools.”  N.J.S.A. 5:12A-1 et seq.; see also N.J.A.C. 
§ 13:69N-1.1 et seq. (regulations implementing the law).   
II.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The NBA, MLB, the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association (“NCAA”), the National Football League 
(“NFL”), and the National Hockey League (“NHL”) 
(collectively, the “Leagues”), sued New Jersey Governor 
Chris Christie, New Jersey’s Racing Commissioner, and New 
Jersey’s Director of Gaming Enforcement (the “State” or 
“New Jersey”), under 28 U.S.C. § 2703, asserting that the 
Sports Wagering Law is invalidated by PASPA.  The New 
Jersey Senate Majority Leader Stephen Sweeney and House 
Speaker Sheila Oliver intervened as defendants, alongside the 
New Jersey Thoroughbred Horsemen’s Association, the 
owner of the Monmouth Park Racetrack, a business where 
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sports gambling would occur under the Sports Wagering Law 
(the “NJTHA”) (collectively, “Appellants”). 
The State moved to dismiss for lack of standing and 
the District Court ordered expedited discovery on that 
question.  After the completion of discovery and oral 
arguments, the District Court concluded that the Leagues 
have standing.  Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, 
No. 12-4947, 2012 WL 6698684 (D.N.J. Dec. 21, 2012) 
(“NCAA I”).   
With the constitutionality of PASPA then squarely at 
issue, the District Court invited the United States to intervene 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2403.  The District Court ultimately 
upheld PASPA’s constitutionality, granted summary 
judgment to the Leagues, and enjoined the Sports Wagering 
Law from going into effect.  Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. 
Christie, __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2013 WL 772679 (D.N.J. Feb. 
28, 2013) (“NCAA II”).  This expedited appeal followed. 
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III.  JURISDICTION: WHETHER THE LEAGUES 
HAVE STANDING  
 The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have appellate 
jurisdiction over its final judgment under § 1291.  Our 
jurisdiction, however, is limited by the Constitution’s “cases” 
and “controversies” requirement.  U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2.  
To satisfy this jurisdictional limitation, the party invoking 
federal court authority must demonstrate that he or she has 
standing to bring the case.
1
 
The Leagues argue they have standing because their 
own games are the subject of the Sports Wagering Law.  
They also contend that the law will increase the total amount 
                                              
1
  The United States notes there may be questions as to 
whether the District Court’s injunction is an appealable final 
order because it does not specify what steps the State must 
undertake to comply with the injunction, but we conclude that 
the injunction is an appealable final order because the merits 
opinion describes what the State must do—refrain from 
licensing sports gambling.  See NCAA II, 2013 WL 772679, at 
*25.   
22 
 
of gambling on sports available, thereby souring the public’s 
perception of the Leagues as people suspect that games are 
affected by individuals with a perhaps competing hidden 
monetary stake in their outcome.  Appellants counter that the 
Leagues cannot show a concrete, non-speculative injury from 
any potential increase in legal gambling.  
The District Court granted summary judgment to the 
Leagues, reasoning that Markell supports a holding that the 
Leagues have standing, and that reputational injury is a 
legally cognizable harm that may confer standing.  It also 
found sufficient facts in the record to conclude that the Sports 
Wagering Law will result in an increase in fans’ negative 
perceptions of the Leagues.  We review de novo the legal 
conclusion that the Leagues have standing, and we review for 
clear error any factual findings underlying the District Court’s 
determination.  Marion v. TDI Inc., 591 F.3d 137, 146 (3d 
Cir. 2010).   
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A. The Effect of Markell  
 Markell, like this case, was a lawsuit by the Leagues to 
stop a state from licensing single-game betting on the 
outcome of sporting events.  In Markell we “beg[a]n [our 
analysis], as always, by considering whether we ha[d] 
jurisdiction to hear [the] appeal,” and later concluded that we 
did have jurisdiction.  579 F.3d at 297, 300.  But, contrary to 
the Leagues’ suggestion, our analysis was limited to whether 
we had appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a).  See 
id.  We did not explicitly consider Article III standing, and a 
“drive-by jurisdictional ruling, in which jurisdiction has been 
assumed by the parties . . . does not create binding 
precedent.”  United States v. Stoerr, 695 F.3d 271, 277 n.5 
(3d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and alterations 
omitted).  Therefore, we will not rely on Markell for our 
standing analysis.  
B. Standing Law Generally 
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 Under the familiar three-part test, to establish standing, 
a plaintiff must show (1) an “injury in fact,” i.e., an actual or 
imminently threatened injury that is “concrete and 
particularized” to the plaintiff; (2) causation, i.e., traceability 
of the injury to the actions of the defendant; and (3) 
redressability of the injury by a favorable decision by the 
Court.  Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 
(2009).   
Causation and redressability may be met when “a party 
. . . challenge[s] government action that permits or authorizes 
third-party conduct that would otherwise be illegal in the 
absence of the Government’s action.”  Nat’l Wrestling 
Coaches Ass’n v. Dep’t of Educ., 366 F.3d 930, 940-41 (D.C. 
Cir. 2004).  Here, the Leagues do not purport to enjoin third 
parties from attempting to fix games.  The Leagues have sued 
to block the Sports Wagering Law, which they assert will 
result in a taint upon their games, and is a law that by 
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definition constitutes state action to license conduct that 
would not otherwise occur.  Under the reasoning of National 
Wrestling Coaches, causation and redressability are thus 
satisfied, and all arguments implicitly aimed at those two 
prongs are suspect. 
Accordingly, we focus on the injury-in-fact 
requirement, the “contours of [which], while not precisely 
defined, are very generous.”  Bowman v. Wilson, 672 F.2d 
1145, 1151 (3d Cir. 1982).  Indeed, all that Article III requires 
is an identifiable trifle of injury, United States v. Students 
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 
690 n.14 (1973), which may exist if the plaintiff “has . . . a 
personal stake in the outcome of [the] litigation.”  The Pitt 
News v. Fisher, 215 F.3d 354, 360 (3d Cir. 2000); see also 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 n.1 (1992) 
(noting that to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement the 
“injury must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual 
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way”).  To meet this burden, the Leagues must present 
evidence “in the same way as [for] any other matter on which 
[they] bear[] the burden of proof.”  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.   
C. Whether the Sports Wagering Law Causes the 
Leagues An Injury In Fact 
As noted, the Leagues offer two independent bases for 
standing: that the Sports Wagering Law makes the Leagues’ 
games the object of state-licensed gambling and that they will 
suffer reputational harm if such activity expands.  We address 
each in turn. 
1. The Leagues are essentially the object of the 
Sports Wagering Law  
Injury in fact may be established when the plaintiff 
himself is the object of the action at issue.  Id.  Thus, the 
Leagues are correct that if the Sports Wagering Law is 
directed at them, the injury-in-fact requirement is satisfied. 
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Fairly read, however, the Sports Wagering Law does 
not directly regulate the Leagues, but instead regulates the 
activities that may occur at the State’s casinos and racetracks.  
We thus hesitate to conclude that the Leagues may rely solely 
on the existence of the Sports Wagering Law to show injury.  
But that is not to say that we are glib with respect to one of 
the main purposes of the law: to use the Leagues’ games for 
profit.  Cf. NFL v. Governor of Del., 435 F. Supp. 1372, 1378 
(D. Del. 1972) (Stapleton, J.) (explaining that Delaware’s 
sports lottery sought to use the NFL’s “schedules, scores and 
public popularity” to “mak[e] profits [Delaware] [c]ould not 
make but for the existence of the NFL”).  The Sports 
Wagering Law is thus, in a sense, as much directed at the 
Leagues’ events as it is aimed at the casinos.  This is not a 
generalized grievance like those asserted by environmental 
groups over regulation of wildlife in cases where the Supreme 
Court has found no standing, such as in Lujan or Summers.  
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The law here aims to license private individuals to cultivate 
the fruits of the Leagues’ labor.   
Appellants counter that the Leagues’ interest in not 
seeing their games subject to wagering is a non-cognizable 
“claim for the loss of psychic satisfaction.”  N.J. Br. at 31 
(citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 
107 (1998)).  But the holding in Steel Company was that a 
claim for psychic satisfaction did not present a redressable 
injury.  In that case, a private plaintiff sought a payment into 
the U.S. Treasury by a private company that had violated 
federal law, and asserted that such was a redressable injury 
because the plaintiff would feel “psychic satisfaction” in 
seeing the payment made.  See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 107.  
The case is thus inapposite here, where redressability is 
established because the Leagues assert harm from the very 
government action they seek to enjoin—the enforcement of 
the Sports Wagering Law.  Moreover, the Leagues do not 
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assert merely psychic, but reputational harm, a very real and 
very redressable injury.   
Appellants also argue that because the Leagues do not 
have a proprietary interest in the outcomes of their games 
they may not seek to prevent others from profiting from them.  
This contention relies on the holding in NFL v. Governor of 
Delaware, that a Delaware lottery based on the outcome of 
NFL games did not constitute a misappropriation of the 
NFL’s property.  435 F. Supp. at 1378-79.  But here the 
Leagues do not complain of an invasion of any proprietary 
interest, but only refer to the fact of appropriation of their 
labor to show that the Sports Wagering Law is directed at 
them. 
2. Reputational Harm as Injury In Fact 
The Leagues may also meet their burden of 
establishing injury from a law aimed at their games by 
proving that the activity sanctioned by that law threatens to 
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cause them reputational harm amongst their fans and the 
public. 
 (a) Reputation Harm Is a Legally 
Cognizable Injury 
As a matter of law, reputational harm is a cognizable 
injury in fact.  The Supreme Court so held in Meese v. Keene, 
where it concluded that a senator who wished to screen films 
produced by a foreign company had standing to challenge a 
law requiring the identification of such films as foreign 
“political propaganda” because the label could harm his 
reputation with the public and hurt his chances at reelection.  
481 U.S. 465, 473-74 (1987).  Essentially, the senator 
challenged his unwanted association with an undesirable 
label.  Our cases have also recognized that reputational harm 
is an injury sufficient to confer standing.  See, e.g., Bowers v. 
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 475 F.3d 524, 542-43 (3d Cir. 
2007) (concluding that an attorney has standing to challenge a 
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public reprimand because the sanction “affect[s] [his] 
reputation”); Doe v. Nat’l Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 199 F.3d 146, 
153 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that a student had standing to 
challenge a rule requiring that he be identified as disabled 
because such label could sour the perception of him by 
“people who can affect his future and his livelihood”). 
The Leagues’ claim of injury is identical to that of the 
plaintiffs in Keene and Doe: they are harmed by their 
unwanted association with an activity they (and large portions 
of the public) disapprove of—gambling.  Appellants do not 
dispute this legal premise, but attack the strength of the 
evidence that the Leagues have proffered to tie the Sports 
Wagering Law to the reputational harm they assert.  These 
arguments overstate what the Leagues must show to 
demonstrate reputational harm in this context and, in any 
case, ignore the strength of the proffered evidence. 
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(b) The Evidence In the Record Supports 
the District Court’s Conclusion that 
Reputational Harm Will Occur 
To be sure, at the summary judgment stage, mere 
allegations of harm are insufficient and specific facts are 
required.  See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.  And a plaintiff’s claim 
of fear of reputational harm must always be “based in 
reality.”  Doe, 199 F.3d at 153.  But the “nature and extent of 
facts that must be averred” depends on the nature of the 
asserted injury.  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561-62.  No one would 
doubt, for example, that an individual forced to wear a scarlet 
“A” on her clothing has standing to challenge that action 
based on reputational harm.  Indeed, that was the import of 
our holding in Doe where, after discounting all of the 
evidence presented to prove that others’ perception of the 
plaintiff as disabled could harm him, we concluded that his 
fear of reputational harm based on an unwanted and 
stigmatizing label was nevertheless based “in reality.”  199 
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F.3d at 153.  In Keene, by contrast, where the reputational 
harm from being associated with “foreign political 
propaganda” was not as intuitive, the Supreme Court held that 
an undisputed expert opinion that such labels may stigmatize 
individuals was sufficient to make the required injury-in-fact 
showing.  481 U.S. at 490.  This suggests a spectrum wherein 
the sufficiency of the showing that must be made to establish 
reputational harm depends on the circumstances of each case.  
Here, the reputational harm that results from increasingly 
associating the Leagues’ games with gambling is fairly 
intuitive.   
For one, the conclusion that there is a link between 
legalizing sports gambling and harm to the integrity of the 
Leagues’ games has been reached by several Congresses that 
have passed laws addressing gambling and sports, see, e.g., 
H.R. Rep. No. 88-1053 (1963) (noting that when gambling 
interests are involved, the “temptation to fix games has 
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become very great,” which in turn harms the honesty of the 
games); Senate Report at 3555 (noting that PASPA was 
necessary to “maintain the integrity of our national pastime”).  
It is, indeed, the specific conclusion reached by the Congress 
that enacted PASPA, as reflected by the statutory cause of 
action conferred to the Leagues to enforce the law when their 
individual games are the target of state-licensed sports 
wagering.  See 28 U.S.C. § 3703.  And, presumably, it has 
also been at least part of the conclusions of the various state 
legislatures that have blocked the practice throughout our 
history.   
But even if polls like in Keene were always required in 
reputational harm cases, the Leagues have met that burden.  
The record is replete with evidence showing that being 
associated with gambling is stigmatizing, regardless of 
whether the gambling is legal or illegal.  Before the District 
Court were studies showing that: (1) some fans from each 
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League viewed gambling as a problem area for the Leagues, 
and some fans expressed their belief that game fixing most 
threatened the Leagues’ integrity [App. 1605-06]; (2) some 
fans did not want a professional sports franchise to open in 
Las Vegas, and some fans would be less likely to spend 
money on the Leagues if that occurred; and (3) a large 
number of fans oppose the expansion of legalized sports 
betting. [2293-98.]  This more than suffices to meet the 
Leagues’ evidentiary burden under Keene and Doe—being 
associated with gambling is undesirable and harmful to one’s 
reputation. 
  Although the Leagues could end their injury in fact 
proffer there, they also set forth evidence establishing a clear 
link between the Sports Wagering Law and increased 
incentives for game-rigging.  First, the State’s own expert 
noted that state-licensing of sports gambling will result in an 
increase in the total amount of (legal plus illegal) gambling 
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on sports.  [App. 325].   Second, a report by the National 
Gambling Impact Study Commission, prepared at the behest 
of Congress in 1999, explains that athletes are “often tempted 
to bet on contests in which they participate, undermining the 
integrity of sporting contests.”  App. 743.  Third, there has 
been at least one instance of match-fixing for NCAA games 
as a result of wagers placed through legitimate channels, and 
several as a result of wagers placed in illegal markets for most 
of the Leagues, and NCAA players have affected or have 
been asked to affect the outcome of games “because of 
gambling debt.”  App. 2245.  Thus, more legal gambling 
leads to more total gambling, which in turn leads to an 
increased incentive to fix or attempt to fix the Leagues’ 
matches. 
This evidence, together, permits the factual conclusion 
that being associated with gambling is a stigmatizing label 
and that, to the extent that the Sports Wagering Law will 
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increase the total amount of gambling as New Jersey’s expert 
expects, it will increase some fans’ “negative perceptions [of 
the Leagues] attributed to game fixing and gambling.”  NCAA 
I, 2013 WL 6698684, at *6.  We discern no clear error in the 
District Court’s factual conclusions as derived from these 
surveys and reports.
2
 
3. Appellants’ Counterarguments  
Appellants posit that the Leagues cannot establish 
injury based on any stigma that may attach to wagering, 
because fans would not think negatively of the Leagues given 
                                              
2
  More fundamentally, it is clear to us that gambling and 
match-fixing scandals tend to tarnish the Leagues’ 
reputations.  Media reports to that effect abound.  To take but 
one, after the Tim Donaghy NBA gambling and game-fixing 
scandal, commentators noted that “the integrity of the 
[NBA’s] games just took a major hit.”  J.A. Adande, Ref 
investigation only adds to bad perception of NBA, ESPN.com, 
July 19, 2007, 
http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/columns/story?id=2943704.  It 
is simply untenable to hold that the Leagues have not 
identified a trifle of reputational harm from an increase in 
even legal or licensed sports gambling. 
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that it is the State that is licensing the activity against the 
Leagues’ wishes.  But as then-Circuit Judge Scalia explained, 
an argument that the “public reaction [to] the alleged harm . . 
. is an irrational one . . . is irrelevant to the question of core, 
constitutional injury-in-fact, which requires no more than de 
facto causality.”  Block v. Meese, 793 F.2d 1303, 1309 (D.C. 
Cir. 1986). 
We also find unpersuasive the contention that the 
increase in incentives to rig the outcome of the Leagues’ 
games cannot give rise to standing because they depend on 
unknown actions of third parties.  The Leagues do not seek to 
enjoin individuals from rigging games; they seek to enjoin 
New Jersey’s law.  That a third party’s action may be 
necessary to complete the complained-of harm does not 
negate the existence of an injury in fact from the Sports 
Wagering Law or negate causation and redressability.  “It is 
impossible to maintain . . . that there is no standing to sue 
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regarding action of a defendant which harms the plaintiff only 
through the reaction of third persons.  If that principle were 
true, it is difficult to see how libel actions or suits for 
inducing breach of contract could be brought in federal court. 
. . .”  Id.  Thus, “the traceability requirement [may be] met 
even where the conduct in question might not have been a 
proximate cause of the harm.”  Edmonson v. Lincoln Nat’l 
Life Ins. Co., __ F.3d __, No. 12-1581, 2013 WL  4007553, 
*7 (3d Cir. Aug. 7, 2013) (citing The Pitt News, 215 F.3d at 
360-61).
3
 
                                              
3
  Appellants rely almost exclusively on Simon v. East 
Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976), 
for the proposition that the reputational injury at issue here is 
insufficient because it “result[s] ‘from the independent action 
of some third party not before the court.’”  N.J. Br. at 23 
(quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 41-42).  This argument greatly 
overstates the effect of Simon.  There, a group of indigent 
individuals brought suit against the IRS, asserting that the 
IRS’s tax designation of certain hospitals harmed them by 
making it less likely that the hospitals would provide them 
free services.  The Supreme Court concluded that the 
plaintiffs lacked standing because it was “purely speculative 
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Appellants also assert that granting summary judgment 
to the Leagues was improper because the effect of the studies 
and opinion polls was disputed by Appellants’ own evidence.  
In particular, they point to evidence that (1) the Leagues have 
been economically prospering despite pervasive unregulated 
sports gambling and state-licensed sports gambling in 
Nevada; and (2) some individuals would have no interest in 
the Leagues’ product unless they had a monetary interest in 
the outcome of games.  But these arguments, which sound 
more like an appeal to commonsense with which, no doubt, 
many will agree as a policy matter, do not legally deprive the 
                                                                                                     
whether the denials of services . . . fairly can be traced to [the 
IRS’ actions] or instead result from decisions made by the 
hospitals without regard to the tax implications.”  Simon, 426 
U.S. at 42-43.  But here we are dealing with a law that 
licenses conduct that casinos could not otherwise undertake 
under the State’s auspices, and thus the third party’s actions 
are not truly independent of the State’s conduct.  See Nat’l 
Wrestling Coaches Ass’n, 366 F.3d at 941.   
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Leagues of standing and are insufficient to raise a genuine 
issue of material fact. 
A plaintiff does not lose standing to challenge an 
otherwise injurious action simply because he may also derive 
some benefit from it.  Our standing analysis is not an 
accounting exercise and it does not require a decision on the 
merits.  See, e.g., Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 
253, 265 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that “the fact that an injury 
may be outweighed by other benefits, while often sufficient to 
defeat a claim for damages, does not negate standing”); see 
also 13A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, FED. 
PRAC. & PROC. JURIS. 3d § 3531.4, 147 (3d ed. 2008).  Nor 
must the Leagues construct counterfactuals analyzing whether 
they would have done better if PASPA had instituted a 
complete ban of state-licensed sports gambling or, 
conversely, worse if PASPA had not existed.  And that fans 
may still buy tickets is not inconsistent with the notion that 
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the Leagues’ esteem suffers in the eyes of fans, which 
requires the Leagues to take efforts to rehabilitate their image.  
That alone establishes injury in fact; that the Leagues may 
have been successful at rehabilitating their images does not 
deprive them of standing.  See, e.g., Keene, 481 U.S. at 475 
(“[T]he need to take . . . affirmative steps to avoid the risk of 
harm to [one’s] reputation constitutes a cognizable injury.”). 
As a last resort, Appellants question the Leagues’ 
commitment to their own argument that state-licensed sports 
wagering harms them, noting that the Leagues hold events in 
jurisdictions, such as Canada and England, where gambling 
on sports is licensed, and that they promote and profit from 
products that are akin to gambling on sports, such as pay-to-
play fantasy leagues.  But standing is not defeated by a 
plaintiff’s alleged unclean hands and does not require 
balancing the equities.  That the Leagues may believe that 
holding events in Canada and England is not injurious to 
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them does not negate that harm may arise from an expansion 
of sports wagering to the entire country.  The same can be 
said of the Leagues’ promotion of fantasy sports, even if we 
accept that these activities are akin to head-to-head 
gambling.
4
  And, as even Appellants recognize, it is not the 
Leagues’ subjective beliefs that control.  See Lujan, 504 U.S. 
at 564. 
* * * 
That the Leagues have standing to enforce a 
prohibition on state-licensed gambling on their athletic 
contests seems to us a straightforward conclusion, particularly 
                                              
4
  We note, however, the legal difference between paying 
fees to participate in fantasy leagues and single-game 
wagering as contemplated by the Sports Wagering Law.  See 
Humphrey v. Viacom, Inc., No. 06-2768 (DMC), 2007 WL 
1797648, at *9 (D.N.J. June 20, 2007) (holding that fantasy 
leagues that require an entry fee are not subject to anti-betting 
and wagering laws); Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc. v. Gibson, 359 
P.2d 85, 86-87 (Nev. 1961) (holding that a “hole-in-one” 
contest that required an entry fee was a prize contest, not a 
wager). 
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given the proven stigmatizing effect of having sporting 
contests associated with gambling, a link that is confirmed by 
commonsense and Congress’ own conclusions.5 
IV.  THE MERITS 
 We turn now to the merits.  The centerpiece of 
Appellants and amici’s attack on PASPA is that it 
impermissibly commandeers the states.  But at least one party 
raises the spectre that PASPA is also beyond Congress’ 
authority under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution.  We thus examine first whether Congress may 
even regulate the activities that PASPA governs.  Only after 
concluding that Congress may do so can we consider 
                                              
5
  We also note that, although the United States’ 
intervention does not always give us jurisdiction, a court may 
treat intervention as a separate suit over which it has 
jurisdiction, if the intervenor has standing, particularly when 
the intervenor enters the proceedings at an early stage.  See, 
e.g., Disability Advocates, Inc. v. New York Coal. For 
Assisted Living, Inc., 675 F.3d 149, 161 (2d Cir. 2012); Fuller 
v. Volk, 351 F.2d 323, 328 (3d Cir. 1965).  Thus, the United 
States’ intervention independently supports our jurisdiction.  
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whether, in exercising its affirmative powers, Congress 
exceed a limitation imposed in the Constitution, such as by 
the anti-commandeering and equal sovereignty principles.  
See, e.g., Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 148-49 (2000) 
(asking, first, whether a law was within Commerce Clause 
powers and, second, whether the law violated the Tenth 
Amendment).
6
 
A. Whether PASPA is Within Congress’ Commerce 
Clause Power 
 1. Modern Commerce Clause Law 
Among Congress’ enumerated powers in Article I is 
the ability to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and 
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”  U.S. 
                                              
6
  We review de novo a determination regarding 
PASPA’s constitutionality, Gov’t of V.I. v. Steven, 134 F.3d 
526, 527 (3d Cir. 1998), and begin with the “time-honored 
presumption that [an act of Congress] is a constitutional 
exercise of legislative power.”  Reno, 528 U.S. at 148 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Close v. 
Glenwood Cemetery, 107 U.S. 446, 475 (1883)). 
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CONST., Art. I., § 8, cl. 3.  As is well-known, since NLRB v. 
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 U.S. 1 (1937), the 
Commerce Clause has been construed to give Congress 
“considerabl[e] . . . latitude in regulating conduct and 
transactions.”  United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608 
(2000).  For one, Congress may regulate an activity that 
“substantially affects interstate commerce” if it “arise[s] out 
of or [is] connected with a commercial transaction.”  United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995).  By contrast, 
regulations of non-economic activity are disfavored.  Id. at 
567 (striking down a law regulating possession of weapons 
near schools); see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 
(invalidating a law regulating gender-motivated violence). 
2. Gambling and the Leagues’ Contests, 
Considered Separately or Together, 
Substantially Affect Interstate Commerce 
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Guided by these principles, it is self-evident that the 
activity PASPA targets, state-licensed wagering on sports, 
may be regulated consistent with the Commerce Clause.   
First, both wagering and national sports are economic 
activities.  A wager is simply a contingent contract involving 
“two or more . . . parties, having mutual rights in respect to 
the money or other thing wagered.”  Gibson, 359 P.2d at 86; 
see also N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 5:12-21 (defining gambling as 
engaging in a game “for money, property, checks, or any 
representative of value”). There can also be no doubt that the 
operations of the Leagues are economic activities, as they 
preside essentially over for-profit entertainment.  See, e.g., 
App. 1444 (NFL self-describing its “complex business model 
that includes a diverse range of revenue streams, which 
contribute . . . to company profitability”). 
Second, there can be no serious dispute that the 
professional and amateur sporting events at the heart of the 
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Leagues’ operations “substantially affect” interstate 
commerce.  The Leagues are associations comprised of 
thousands of clubs and members, [App. 105], which in turn 
govern the operations of thousands of sports teams organized 
across the United States, competing for fans and revenue 
across the country.  “Thousands of Americans earn a . . . 
livelihood in professional sports.  Tens of thousands of others 
participate in college sports.”  Senate Report at 3557.  Indeed, 
some of the Leagues hold sporting events abroad, affecting 
commerce with Foreign Nations. 
Third, it immediately follows that placing wagers on 
sporting events also substantially affects interstate commerce.  
As New Jersey indicates, Americans gamble up to $500 
billion on sports each year.  [App. 330-31].  And whatever 
effects gambling on sports may have on the games 
themselves, those effects will plainly transcend state 
boundaries and affect a fundamentally national industry.  
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Accordingly, we have deferred to Congressional 
determinations that “gambling involves the use and has an 
effect upon interstate commerce.”  United States v. Riehl, 460 
F.2d 454, 458 (3d Cir. 1972).   
At bottom, it is clear that PASPA is aimed at an 
activity that is “quintessentially economic” and that has 
substantial effects on interstate commerce.  See Raich, 545 
U.S. at 19-20.  Prohibiting the state licensing of this activity 
is thus a “rational . . . means of regulating commerce” in this 
area and within Congress’ power under the Commerce 
Clause.  Id. at 26.
7
 
3. PASPA Does Not Unconstitutionally 
Regulate Purely Local Activities 
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  But see Federal Baseball Club of Balt. v. Nat’l League 
of Prof’l Base Ball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 208-09 (1922) 
(describing MLB’s business as “giving exhibitions of base 
ball, which are purely state affairs,” and concluding that 
baseball is not in interstate commerce for purposes of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act). 
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 Appellants nevertheless assert that PASPA is 
unconstitutional because it “reaches unlimited betting activity 
. . . that cannot possibly affect interstate commerce . . . [such 
as] a casual bet on a Giants-Jets football game between 
family members.”  Br. of NJTHA at 34.  Parsing words from 
the statute, they insist PASPA reaches these activities because 
it prohibits betting in “competitive games” involving 
“amateur or professional athletes.”  28 U.S.C. § 3702.  This 
argument is meritless. 
 For one, PASPA on its face does not reach the 
intrastate activities that Appellants contend it does.  PASPA 
prohibits only gambling “schemes” and only those carried out 
“pursuant to law or compact.”  28 U.S.C. § 3702.  The 
activities described in Appellants’ examples are nor carried 
out pursuant to state law, or pursuant to “a systemic plan; a 
connected or orderly arrangement . . . [or] [a]n artful plot or 
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plan.”  Black’s Law Dictionary (9th Ed. 2009) (defining 
“scheme”).  
Moreover, even entertaining that PASPA somehow 
reaches these activities, Congressional action over them is 
permissible if Congress has a “rational basis” for concluding 
that the activity in the aggregate has a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce.  Raich, 545 U.S. at 22.  The rule of an 
unbroken line from Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), 
to Raich—respectively upholding limitations on growing 
wheat at home and personal marijuana consumption—is that 
when it comes to legislating economic activity, Congress can 
regulate “even activity that is purely intrastate in character . . . 
where the activity, combined with like conduct by other 
similarly situated, affects commerce among the States or with 
foreign nations.”  Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 
833, 840 (1976), overruled on other grounds by Garcia v. San 
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) 
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(alterations omitted).  And there can be no doubt that 
Congress had a rational basis to conclude that the intrastate 
activities at issue substantially affect interstate commerce, 
given the reach of gambling, sports, and sports wagering into 
the far corners of the economies of the states, documented 
above.
8
 
 Appellants finally seek support in the Supreme Court’s 
holding that the “individual mandate” of the Affordable Care 
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  Moreover, if PASPA reaching activities that are purely 
intrastate in nature were constitutionally problematic, we 
would construe its language as not reaching such acts.  After 
all, “[t]he cardinal principle of statutory construction is to 
save and not to destroy . . . . [A]s between two possible 
interpretations of a statute, by one of which it would be 
unconstitutional and by the other valid, our plain duty is to 
adopt that which will save the act.”  Jones & Laughlin Steel, 
301 U.S. at 30.  Appellants’ reading of PASPA to reach 
casual bets between friends steamrolls that principle.  At the 
very worst, we would leave for another day the question of 
whether PASPA may constitutionally be applied to such a 
local wager.  Appellants today have not shown that “no set of 
circumstances exists under which the [challenged] Act would 
be valid.”  CMR D.N. Corp. v. City of Phila., 703 F.3d 612, 
623 (3d Cir. 2013) (alteration in original). 
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Act is beyond Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause.  
See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 
(2012).  But the problem in Sebelius was that the method 
chosen to regulate (forcing into economic activity individuals 
previously not in the market for health insurance) was beyond 
Congress’ power.  Here, the method of regulation, banning an 
activity altogether (in this case the expansion of State-
sponsored sports betting), is neither novel nor problematic.  
See, e.g., Raich, 545 U.S. at 27. 
B. Whether PASPA Impermissibly Commandeers the 
States 
Having concluded that Congress may regulate sports 
wagering consistent with the Commerce Clause, we turn to 
PASPA’s operation in the case before us.   
As noted, PASPA makes it “unlawful for a 
governmental entity to . . . authorize by law or compact” 
gambling on sports.  28 U.S.C. § 3702.  This is classic 
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preemption language that operates, via the Constitution’s 
Supremacy Clause, see U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2, to 
invalidate state laws that are contrary to the federal statute.  
See, e.g., Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. City of Los Angeles, 133 S. 
Ct. 2096, 2100-01, 2102 (2013) (explaining that the provision 
of the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 
1994 (“FAAAA”) that states a “‘State . . . may not enact or 
enforce a law . . . related to a price, route, or service of any 
motor carrier . . . with respect to the transportation of 
property’ . . . preempts State laws related to a price, route, or 
service of any motor carrier with respect to the transportation 
of property” (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1)).  The Sports 
Wagering Law is precisely what PASPA says the states may 
not do—a purported authorization by law of sports wagering.  
It is therefore invalidated by PASPA.
9
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  This straightforward operation of the Supremacy 
Clause, which operates on states laws that are foreclosed by a 
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 Appellants do not contest any of the foregoing, but 
argue instead that PASPA’s operation over the Sports 
Wagering Law violates the “anti-commandeering” principle, 
which bars Congress from conscripting the states into doing 
the work of federal officials.  The import of this argument, 
then, is that impermissible anti-commandeering may occur 
even when all a federal law does is supersede state law via the 
Supremacy Clause.  But the Supreme Court’s anti-
commandeering jurisprudence has never entertained this 
position, let alone accepted it. 
 1. The Anti-Commandeering Principle  
 “As every schoolchild learns, our Constitution 
establishes a system of dual sovereignty between the States 
and the Federal Government.”  Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 
452, 457 (1991).  And it is well-known that all powers not 
                                                                                                     
stand-alone federal provision, is not to be confused with field 
preemption of sports wagering, a topic we discuss at part 
IV.B.2.d below.  
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explicitly conferred to the federal government are reserved to 
the states, a maxim reflected in the text of the Tenth 
Amendment.  U.S. CONST., amdt. X; see also United States v. 
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123-24 (1941) (describing this as a 
“truism” embodied by the Tenth Amendment). 
Among the important corollaries that flow from the 
foregoing is that any law that “commandeers the legislative 
processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact 
and enforce a federal regulatory program” is beyond the 
inherent limitations on federal power within our dual system.  
Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 
264, 283, 288 (1981).  Stated differently, Congress “lacks the 
power directly to compel the States to require or prohibit” 
acts which Congress itself may require or prohibit.  New York 
v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166, 180 (1992).  The 
Supreme Court has struck down laws based on these 
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principles on only two occasions, both distinguishable from 
PASPA. 
 (a) Permissible regulation in a pre-
emptible field: Hodel and FERC 
The first modern, relevant incarnation of the anti-
commandeering principle appeared in Hodel v. Virginia 
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n.  The law at issue there 
imposed federal standards for coal mining on certain surfaces 
and required any state that wished to “assume permanent 
regulatory authority over . . . surface coal mining operations” 
to “submit a proposed permanent program” to the Federal 
Government, which, among other things, required the “state 
legislature [to] enact[] laws implementing the environmental 
protection standards established by the [a]ct.”  Hodel, 452 
U.S. at 271.  If a particular state did not wish to implement 
the federal standards, the federal government would step in to 
do so.  Id. at 272.  The Supreme Court upheld the provisions, 
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noting that they neither compelled the states to adopt the 
federal standards, nor required them “to expend any state 
funds,” nor coerced them into “participat[ing] in the federal 
regulatory program in any manner whatsoever.”  Id. at 288.  
The Court further concluded that Congress could have chosen 
to completely preempt the field by simply assuming oversight 
of the regulations itself.  Id.  It thus held that the Tenth 
Amendment posed no obstacle to a system by which 
Congress “chose to allow the States a regulatory role.”  Id. at 
290.  As the Court later characterized Hodel, the scheme there 
did not violate the anti-commandeering principle because it 
“merely made compliance with federal standards a 
precondition to continued state regulation in an otherwise pre-
empted field.”  Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 926 
(1997). 
The next year, in F.E.R.C. v. Mississippi, the Court 
upheld a provision requiring state utility regulatory 
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commissions to “consider” whether to enact certain standards 
for energy efficiency but leaving to the states the ultimate 
choice of whether to adopt those standards or not.  456 U.S. 
742, 746, 769-70 (1982).  The Court upheld the law despite 
its outright commandeering of the state resources needed to 
consider and study the federal standards, because the law did 
not definitely require the enactment or implementation of 
federal standards.  Id. at 764.  The Court, noting that 
Congress had simply regulated where it could have “pre-
empt[ed] the States entirely” but instead chose to leave some 
room for the states to maneuver, saw the case as “only one 
step beyond Hodel.”  Id.   
 (b) Permissible Prohibitions on State 
Action: Baker and Reno 
In a different pair of anti-commandeering cases, the 
Court upheld affirmative prohibitions on state action that 
effectively invalidated contrary state laws and even required 
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the states to enact new measures.  First, in South Carolina v. 
Baker, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of laws that 
“directly regulated the States by prohibiting outright the 
issuance of bearer bonds.”  485 U.S. 505, 511 (1988).  These 
rules, which also applied to private debt issuers, required the 
states to “amend a substantial number of statutes in order to 
[comply].”  Id. at 514.  The Court concluded this result did 
not run afoul the Tenth Amendment because it did not “seek 
to control or influence the manner in which States regulate 
private parties” but was simply “an inevitable consequence of 
regulating a state activity,” id.  In subsequent cases, the Court 
explained that the regulation in Baker was permissible 
because it simply “subjected a State to the same legislation 
applicable to private parties.”  New York, 505 U.S. at 160.  
Then, in Reno v. Condon, the Court unanimously 
rejected an anti-commandeering challenge to a law 
prohibiting states from disseminating personal information 
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obtained by state departments of motor vehicles.  South 
Carolina complained that the act required its employees to 
learn its provisions and expend resources to comply and, 
indeed, the federal law effectively blocked the operation of 
state laws governing the disclosure of that information.  528 
U.S. at 150.  The Court agreed “that the [act] will require time 
and effort on the part of state employees” but otherwise 
rejected the anti-commandeering challenge because, like the 
law in Baker, the law “d[id] not require the States in their 
sovereign capacity to regulate their own citizens[,] . . . d[id] 
not require the [State] Legislature[s] to enact any laws or 
regulations, and it d[id] not require state officials to assist in 
the enforcement of federal statutes regulating private 
individuals.”  Id. at 151.  Moreover, the law did not “seek to 
control[] or influence the manner in which States regulate 
private parties.”  Id. (citing Baker, 485 U.S. at 514-15). 
62 
 
 (c)  Impermissible Anti-Commandeering: 
New York and Printz 
In contrast to the foregoing, the Court has twice struck 
down portions of a federal law on anti-commandeering 
grounds.  The first was in New York v. United States, which 
dealt with a law meant to regulate and encourage the orderly 
disposal of low-level radioactive waste by the states.  505 
U.S. at 149-54.  The “most severe” aspect of the complex 
system of measures established by the law, referred to as the 
“take-title” provision, provided that if a particular state had 
not been able to arrange for the disposal of the radioactive 
waste by a specified date, then that state would have to take 
title to the waste at the request of the waste’s generator.  Id. at 
153-54 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(C)).  The Court, 
based on the notion that “Congress may not simply 
‘commandeer the legislative processes of the States by 
directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal 
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regulatory program,’” id. at 161 (quoting Hodel, 452 U.S. at 
288) (alterations omitted), struck down the take-title 
provision because it did just that: compel the states to either 
enact a regulatory program, or expend resources in taking title 
to the waste.  Id. at 176.  The Court noted that Congress may 
enact measures to encourage the states to act and may “hav[e] 
state law pre-empted by federal regulation” but concluded 
that the take-title provision “crossed the line distinguishing 
encouragement from coercion.”  Id. at 167, 175.  The Court 
also emphasized that the anti-commandeering principle was 
designed, in part, to stop Congress from blurring the line of 
accountability between federal and state officials and from 
skirting responsibility for its choices by foisting them on the 
states.  Id. at 168. 
The Court then applied these principles, in Printz, to 
invalidate the provisions of the Brady Act that required local 
authorities of certain states to run background checks on 
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persons seeking to purchase guns.  The Court held that 
Congress “may neither issue directives requiring the States to 
address particular problems, nor command the States’ officers 
. . . to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.”  
521 U.S. at 935.  The Court was also troubled that these 
provisions required states to “absorb the financial burden of 
implementing a federal regulatory program” and “tak[e] the 
blame for its . . . defects.”  Id. at 930.   
To date, the schemes at issue in New York and Printz 
remain the only two that the Supreme Court has struck down 
under the anti-commandeering doctrine.  Our Court has not 
yet had occasion to consider an anti-commandeering 
challenge.
10
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  Three other cases complete the constellation of the 
Supreme Court’s modern anti-commandeering jurisprudence 
but deal with the applicability of federal labor laws to certain 
State employees.  See Nat’l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 883; 
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 528; Gregory, 501 U.S. at 452.  These 
cases are of marginal relevance, so we do not elaborate on 
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2. Whether PASPA Violates the Anti-
Commandeering Principle 
 (a) Anti-Commandeering and the 
Supremacy Clause 
Appellants’ arguments that PASPA violates anti-
commandeering principles run into an immediate problem: 
not a single case that we have reviewed involved a federal 
law that, like PASPA, simply operated to invalidate contrary 
state laws.  It has thus never been the case that applying the 
Supremacy Clause to invalidate a state law contrary to federal 
proscriptions is tantamount to direct regulation over the 
states, to an invasion of their sovereignty, or to 
commandeering.  Most of the foregoing cases involved 
Congress attempting to directly impose a federal scheme on 
state officials.  If anything, the federal laws in Reno and 
                                                                                                     
them at length.  See also Markell, 579 F.3d at 303 (rejecting 
an argument that PASPA violates the sovereignty principles 
set forth in Gregory). 
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Baker had the effect of invalidating certain contrary state laws 
by prohibiting state action, and both survived.  Indeed, the 
Justices in both New York and Printz disclaimed any notion 
that the anti-commandeering principle somehow suspends the 
operation of the Supremacy Clause on otherwise valid laws.  
For example, in Printz the Court explained that our 
Constitutional structure requires “all state officials . . . to 
enact, enforce, and interpret state law in such a fashion as not 
to obstruct the operation of federal law, and the attendant 
reality [is] that all state actions constituting such obstruction, 
even legislative Acts, are ipso facto invalid.”  521 U.S. at 
913; see also New York, 505 U.S. at 162 (noting that the 
Commerce Clause permits Congress to “hav[e] state law pre-
empted by federal [law]”).   
In light of the fact that the Supremacy Clause is the 
Constitution’s answer to the problem that had made life 
difficult under the Articles of Confederation—the lack of a 
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mechanism to enforce uniform national policies—accepting 
Appellants’ position that a state’s sovereignty is violated 
when it is precluded from following a policy different than 
that set forth by federal law (as New Jersey seeks to do with 
its Sports Wagering Law), would be revolutionary.  See The 
Federalist No. 44, at 323 (James Madison) (B. Fletcher ed. 
1996) (explaining that without the Supremacy Clause “all the 
authorities contained in the proposed Constitution . . . would 
have been annulled, and the new Congress would have been 
reduced to the same impotent condition with [the Articles of 
Confederation]”). 
And it is not hard to see why invalidating contrary 
state law does not implicate a state’s sovereignty or otherwise 
commandeer the states.  When Congress passes a law that 
operates via the Supremacy Clause to invalidate contrary state 
laws, it is not telling the states what to do, it is barring them 
from doing something they want to do.  Anti-commandeering 
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challenges to statutes worded like PASPA have thus 
consistently failed.  See, e.g., Kelley v. United States, 69 F.3d 
1503, 1510 (10th Cir. 1995) (upholding constitutionality of 
intrastate motor carrier statute, noting that it preempted state 
law and in doing so did not “compel[] the states to voluntarily 
act by enacting or administering a federal regulatory 
program”); California Dump Truck Owners Ass’n v. Davis, 
172 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1304 (E.D. Cal. 2001) (upholding 
constitutionality of FAAAA provision against an anti-
commandeering challenge, noting that, unlike the laws in 
New York and Printz, the FAAAA provision, insofar as it 
merely preempts state law, “tell[s] states what not to do”).11   
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  As the Leagues note, numerous federal laws are 
framed to prohibit States from enacting or enforcing laws 
contrary to federal standards, and these regulations all enjoy 
different preemptive qualities.  See, e.g., Farina v. Nokia, 625 
F.3d 97, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that statute which 
provides that “no State . . . shall have any authority to 
regulate the entry of or the rates charged by any commercial 
mobile service” is an express preemption provision); 
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 To be sure, the Supremacy Clause elevates only laws 
that are otherwise within Congress’ power to enact.  See, e.g., 
New York, 504 U.S. at 166 (noting that Congress may not, 
consistent with the Commerce Clause, “regulate state 
governments’ regulation of interstate commerce”).  But we 
have held that Congress may prohibit state-licensed gambling 
consistent with the Commerce Clause.  The argument that 
PASPA is beyond Congress’ authority thus hinges on the 
notion that the invalidation of a state law pursuant to the 
Commerce Clause has the same “commandeering” effect as 
the federal laws struck down in New York and Printz.  We 
turn now to this contention.  
                                                                                                     
MacDonald v. Monsanto, 27 F.3d 1021, 1024 (5th Cir. 1994) 
(noting that law stating that a “State shall not impose or 
continue in effect any requirement for labeling or packing” 
pesticides is a preemption provision).  The operation of these 
and other provisions is called into question by Appellants’ 
view that the everyday operation of the Supremacy Clause 
raises anti-commandeering concerns. 
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(b) PASPA is Unlike the Laws Struck Down 
in New York and Printz 
Appellants’ efforts to analogize PASPA to the 
provisions struck down in New York and Printz are 
unavailing.  Unlike the problematic “take title” provision and 
the background check requirements, PASPA does not require 
or coerce the states to lift a finger—they are not required to 
pass laws, to take title to anything, to conduct background 
checks, to expend any funds, or to in any way enforce federal 
law.  They are not even required, like the states were in 
F.E.R.C., to expend resources considering federal regulatory 
regimes, let alone to adopt them.  Simply put, we discern in 
PASPA no “directives requiring the States to address 
particular problems” and no “command[s] to the States’ 
officers . . . to administer or enforce a federal regulatory 
program.”  Printz, 521 U.S. at 935. 
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As the District Court correctly reasoned, the fact that 
PASPA sets forth a prohibition, while the New York/Printz 
regulations required affirmative action(s) on the part of the 
states, is of significance.  Again, it is hard to see how 
Congress can “commandeer” a state, or how it can be found 
to regulate how a state regulates, if it does not require it to do 
anything at all.  The distinction is palpable from the Supreme 
Court’s anti-commandeering cases themselves.  State laws 
requiring affirmative acts may or may not be constitutional, 
compare F.E.R.C., 456 U.S. at 761-63 (upholding statute 
because requirement that states expend resources considering 
federal standards was not commandeering) with Printz, 521 
U.S. at 904-05 (finding requirement that states perform 
background checks unconstitutional).  On the other hand, 
statutes prohibiting the states from taking certain actions have 
never been struck down even if they require the expenditure 
of some time and effort or the modification or invalidation of 
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contrary state laws, see Baker, 485 U.S. at 515; Reno, 528 
U.S. at 150.  As the District Court carefully demonstrated, in 
all its anti-commandeering cases, the Supreme Court has been 
concerned with conscripting the states into affirmative action.  
See NCAA II, 2013 WL 772679, at *17.
12
 
Recognizing the importance of the 
affirmative/negative command distinction, Appellants assert 
that PASPA does impose an affirmative requirement that the 
states act, by prohibiting them from repealing anti-sports 
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  The circuits that have considered anti-commandeering 
challenges, although addressing laws that are fundamentally 
different from PASPA, have similarly found this distinction 
significant.  See, e.g., Connecticut v. Physicians Health Servs. 
of Conn., 287 F.3d 110, 122 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that a 
provision “limit[ing] states’ power to sue as parens patriae . . 
. does not commandeer any branch of state government 
because it imposes no affirmative duty of any kind on them”); 
Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, 173 F.3d 898, 906 
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (rejecting a commandeering challenge to a 
statute that did “not force state officials to do anything 
affirmative to implement” the statutory provision). 
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wagering provisions.
13
  We agree with Appellants that the 
affirmative act requirement, if not properly applied, may 
permit Congress to “accomplish exactly what the 
commandeering doctrine prohibits” by stopping the states 
from “repealing an existing law.”  Conant v. Walters, 309 
F.3d 629, 646 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J., concurring).  But 
we do not read PASPA to prohibit New Jersey from repealing 
its ban on sports wagering.     
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  Appellants also rely on Coyle v. Smith, where the 
Supreme Court struck down a law requiring Oklahoma to not 
change the location of its capital within seven years of its 
admission into the Union, 221 U.S. 559, 567 (1911), to lessen 
the significance of the “affirmative act” requirement we distill 
from the anti-commandeering cases.  N.J. Br. 42, 44.  But, 
despite the Supreme Court’s citation to Coyle in New York, 
see 505 U.S. at 162, Coyle did not turn on impermissible 
commandeering.  Instead, the Court struck down the statute as 
being traceable to no power granted by Congress in the 
Constitution, pertaining “purely to the internal polic[ies] of 
the state,” and in violation of the principle that all states are 
admitted on equal footing into the Union.  Coyle, 221 U.S. at 
565, 579.  PASPA does not raise any of these concerns, and 
neither do the modern anti-commandeering cases. 
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Under PASPA, “[i]t shall be unlawful for . . . a 
governmental entity to sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, 
license, or authorize by law or compact” a sports wagering 
scheme.  28 U.S.C. § 3702(1) (emphasis added).  Nothing in 
these words requires that the states keep any law in place.  
All that is prohibited is the issuance of gambling “license[s]” 
or the affirmative “authoriz[ation] by law” of gambling 
schemes.  Appellants contend that to the extent a state may 
choose to repeal an affirmative prohibition of sports 
gambling, that is the same as “authorizing” that activity, and 
therefore PASPA precludes repealing prohibitions on 
gambling just as it bars affirmatively licensing it.  This 
argument is problematic in numerous respects.  Most 
basically, it ignores that PASPA speaks only of “authorizing 
by law” a sports gambling scheme.  We do not see how 
having no law in place governing sports wagering is the same 
as authorizing it by law.  Second, the argument ignores that, 
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in reality, the lack of an affirmative prohibition of an activity 
does not mean it is affirmatively authorized by law.  The right 
to do that which is not prohibited derives not from the 
authority of the state but from the inherent rights of the 
people.  Indeed, that the Legislature needed to enact the 
Sports Wagering Law itself belies any contention that the 
mere repeal of New Jersey’s ban on sports gambling was 
sufficient to “authorize [it] by law.”  The amendment to New 
Jersey’s Constitution itself did not purport to affirmatively 
authorize sports wagering but indeed only gave the 
Legislature the power to “authorize by law” such activities.  
N.J. Const. Art. IV, § VII, ¶ 2 (D), (F).  Thus, the New Jersey 
Legislature itself saw a meaningful distinction between 
repealing the ban on sports wagering and authorizing it by 
law, undermining any contention that the amendment alone 
was sufficient to affirmatively authorize sports wagering—the 
Sports Wagering Law was required.  Cf. Hernandez v. Robles, 
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855 N.E.2d 1, 5-6 (N.Y. 2006) (rejecting as “untenable” a 
construction of a domestic relation law, silent on the matter of 
the legality of same-sex marriages, as permitting such 
unions).  Congress in PASPA itself saw a difference between 
general sports gambling activity and that which occurs under 
the auspices of state approval and authorization, and chose to 
reach private activity only to the extent that it is conducted 
“pursuant to State law.”   
In short, Appellants’ attempt to read into PASPA a 
requirement that the states must affirmatively keep a ban on 
sports gambling in their books rests on a false equivalence 
between repeal and authorization and reads the term “by law” 
out of the statute, ignoring the fundamental canon that, as 
between two plausible statutory constructions, we ought to 
prefer the one that does not raise a series of constitutional 
problems.  See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380-81 
(2005). 
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 To be sure, we take seriously the argument that many 
affirmative commands can be easily recast as prohibitions.  
For example, the background check rule of Printz could be 
recast as a requirement that the states refrain from issuing 
handgun permits unless background checks are conducted by 
their officials.  The anti-commandeering principle may not be 
circumvented so easily.  But the distinction between 
PASPA’s blanket ban and Printz’s command, even if the 
latter is recast as a prohibition, remains.  PASPA does not say 
to states “you may only license sports gambling if you 
conscript your officials into policing federal regulations” or 
otherwise impose any condition that the states carry out an 
affirmative act or implement a federal scheme before they 
may regulate or issue a license.  It simply bars certain acts 
under any and all circumstances.  And if affirmative 
commands may always be recast as prohibitions, then the 
prohibitions in myriads of routine federal laws may always be 
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rephrased as affirmative commands.  This shows that 
Appellants’ argument proves too much—the anti-
commandeering cases, under that view, imperil a plethora of 
acts currently termed as prohibitions on the states.   
And, to the extent we entertain the notion that 
PASPA’s straightforward prohibition on action may be recast 
as presenting two options, these options are also quite unlike 
the two coercive choices available in New York—pass a law 
to deal with radioactive waste or expend resources in taking 
title to it.  Neither of PASPA’s two “choices” affirmatively 
requires the states to enact a law, and both choices leave 
much room for the states to make their own policy.  Thus, 
under PASPA, on the one hand, a state may repeal its sports 
wagering ban, a move that will result in the expenditure of no 
resources or effort by any official.  On the other hand, a state 
may choose to keep a complete ban on sports gambling, but it 
is left up to each state to decide how much of a law 
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enforcement priority it wants to make of sports gambling, or 
what the exact contours of the prohibition will be.   
 We agree that these are not easy choices.  And it is 
perhaps true (although there is no textual or other support for 
the idea) that Congress may have suspected that most states 
would choose to keep an actual prohibition on sports 
gambling on the books, rather than permit that activity to go 
on unregulated.  But the fact that Congress gave the states a 
hard or tempting choice does not mean that they were given 
no choice at all, or that the choices are otherwise 
unconstitutional.  See United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 
U.S. 304, 315 (2000) (“A hard choice is not the same as no 
choice.”); see also F.E.R.C., 456 U.S. at 766 (upholding a 
choice between expending state resources to consider federal 
standards or abandoning field to federal regulation).  And 
however hard the choice is in PASPA, it is nowhere near as 
coercive as the provisions in New York that punished states 
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unwilling to enact a regulatory scheme and that did pass 
muster.  See New York, 505 U.S. at 172, 173-74 (upholding a 
provision permitting states with waste disposal sites to charge 
more to non-compliant states and a statute taxing such states 
to the benefit of compliant states); see also City of Abilene v. 
EPA, 325 F.3d 657, 662 (5th Cir. 2003) (explaining that as 
long as “the alternative to implementing a federal regulatory 
program does not offend the Constitution’s guarantees of 
federalism, the fact that the alternative is difficult, expensive 
or otherwise unappealing is insufficient to establish a Tenth 
Amendment violation”).  PASPA imposes no punishment or 
punitive tax.  We also disagree with the suggestion that the 
choices states face under PASPA are as coercive as the 
Medicaid expansion provision struck down in Sebelius, which 
threatened states unwilling to participate in a complex and 
extensive federal regulatory program with the loss of funding 
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amounting to over ten percent of their overall budget.  
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2581.   
Finally, we note that the attempt to equate a ban on 
state-sanctioned sports gambling to a plan by Congress to 
force the states into banning the activity altogether gives far 
too much credit to Congress’ strong-arming powers.  The 
attendant reality is that in the field of regulating certain 
activities, such as gambling, prostitution, and drug use, states 
have always gravitated towards prohibitions, regardless of 
Congress’ efforts.  Indeed, as noted, all but one state 
prohibited broad state-sponsored gambling at the time 
PASPA was enacted.  Congress, by prohibiting state-licensing 
schemes, may indeed have made it harder for states to turn 
their backs on the choices they previously made (although in 
PASPA it made it less hard for New Jersey), but that choice 
was already very hard, and very unlikely to be made to begin 
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with (as New Jersey’s history with the regulation of sports 
gambling also illustrates).   
(c) PASPA as Regulating State Conduct—
Baker and Reno 
Additionally, PASPA is remarkably similar to the 
prohibitions on state action upheld in Baker and Reno.  
Baker’s regulations prohibited the states from issuing bearer 
bonds, which in turn required states to issue new regulations 
and invalidated old ones; Reno’s anti-disclosure provisions 
prohibited the states from disseminating certain information, 
necessitating the expenditure of resources to comply with the 
federally imposed prohibitions.  To the extent PASPA makes 
it unattractive for states to repeal their anti-sports wagering 
laws, which in turn requires enforcement by states, the effort 
PASPA requires is simply that the states enforce the laws 
they choose to maintain, and is therefore plainly less intrusive 
than the laws in Baker and Reno.  PASPA also has the effect, 
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like the laws in those two cases, of rendering inoperative any 
contrary state laws. 
 We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments that 
Baker and Reno are inapposite.  They contend, first, that Reno 
is different because it involved regulation of the states in the 
same way as private parties.  But that overstates the 
regulations at issue in Reno, which were directed at state 
DMVs and only incidentally prohibited private persons from 
further disseminating data they may obtain from the DMVs.  
See 528 U.S. at 144.  Indeed, the Reno Court did “not address 
the question whether general applicability is a constitutional 
requirement for federal regulation of the States.”  Id. at 151.  
And, as mentioned, PASPA does operate on private 
individuals insofar as it prohibits them from engaging in 
state-sponsored gambling.  But private individuals cannot be 
prohibited from issuing gambling licenses, because they have 
never been able to do so.  Second, we find no basis to 
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distinguish PASPA from the laws in Reno and Baker on the 
ground that the latter regulate the states solely as participants 
in the market.  DMVs are uniquely state institutions; states 
thus obtain information through the DMVs not as participants 
in the market, but in their unique role as authorizers of 
commercial activity.  PASPA is no different: it regulates the 
states’ permit-issuing activities by prohibiting the issuance of 
the license altogether, as in Baker, where the state was 
essentially prohibited from issuing the bearer bond.  Third, 
we decline to draw a distinction between PASPA and the 
laws at issue in Reno and Baker on the ground that PASPA 
involves a regulation of the states as states.  The Supreme 
Court’s anti-commandeering cases do not contemplate such 
distinction.
14
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  And, arguably, the Supreme Court’s Tenth 
Amendment jurisprudence cautions against drawing lines 
between activities that are “traditional” to state government 
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Despite the fact that PASPA is very similar to the 
prohibition on state activity upheld unanimously in Reno, 
Appellants insist that certain statements in that opinion 
support its view that PASPA is unconstitutional.  Appellants 
insist that under Reno a law is unconstitutional if it requires 
the states to govern according to Congress’ instructions or if 
it “influences” the ways in which the states regulate their own 
citizens.  See N.J. Br. at 3, 18, 40, 42, 43, 45-46, 52.  But no 
one contends that PASPA requires the states to enact any 
laws, and we have held that it also does not require states to 
maintain existing laws.  And one line from Reno, that the law 
upheld there did not “control or influence the manner in 
which States regulated private parties,” 528 U.S. at 142, 
cannot possibly bear the great weight that Appellants would 
hoist upon it.  Most federal regulation inevitably influences 
                                                                                                     
and those that are not.  See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546 (calling 
such distinctions “unworkable”). 
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the manner in which states regulate private parties.  If that 
were enough to violate the anti-commandeering principle, 
then Hodel and F.E.R.C. were wrongly decided.  Indeed, 
nowhere in Reno (or Baker, from where that line was quoted, 
see id. (quoting Baker, 485 U.S. at 514)), did the Court 
suggest that the absence of an attempt to influence how states 
regulate private parties was required to avoid violating the 
anti-commandeering principle.
15
 
(d) The Sports Wagering Law Conflicts 
With Federal Policy With Respect to 
Sports Gambling and is Therefore 
Preempted 
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  The parties spar over how the accountability concerns 
of anti-commandeering cases weigh here.  But New York and 
Printz make clear that they are not implicated when Congress 
does not enlist the States in the implementation of a federal 
regulatory program.  To strike down any law that may cause 
confusion as to whether a prohibition comes from the federal 
government or from a State’s choice, before considering 
whether that law actually commandeers the States, is to put 
the cart before the horse.  Indeed, the Supreme Court in Reno 
rejected the notion that simply raising the specter of 
accountability problems is enough to find an anti-
commandeering violation.  See 528 U.S. at 150-51.   
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 Alternatively, to the extent PASPA coerces the states 
into keeping in place their sports-wagering bans, that coercion 
may be upheld as fitting into the exception drawn in anti-
commandeering cases for laws that impose federal standards 
over conflicting state rules, in areas where Congress may 
otherwise preempt the field.  Under this view, PASPA gives 
states the choice of either implementing a ban on sports 
gambling or of accepting complete deregulation of that field 
as per the federal standard.  In Hodel, for example, the choice 
was implementing certain minimum-safety regulations or 
living in a world where the federal government enforced 
them.   
PASPA makes clear that the federal policy with 
respect to sports gambling is that such activity should not 
occur under the auspices of a state license.  As noted, PASPA 
prohibits individuals from engaging in a sports gambling 
scheme “pursuant to” state law.  28 U.S.C. § 3702(2).  In 
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other words, even if the provision that offends New Jersey, 
§ 3702(1), were excised from PASPA, § 3702(2) would still 
plainly render the Sports Wagering Law inoperative by 
prohibiting private parties from engaging in gambling 
schemes pursuant to that authority.  Thus, the federal policy 
with respect to sports wagering that § 3702(2) evinces is 
clear: to stop private parties from resorting to state law as a 
cover for gambling on sports.  The Sports Wagering Law, in 
purporting to permit individuals to skirt § 3702(2), 
“authorizes [private parties] to engage in conduct that the 
federal [Act] forbids, [and therefore] it ‘stands as an obstacle 
to the[] accomplishment and execution of the full purposes 
and objectives of Congress,’” and accordingly conflicts with 
PASPA and is preempted.  See Mich. Canners & Freezers 
Ass’n, Inc. v. Agric. Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461, 
469 (1984).
16
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  New Jersey asks that we ignore this argument because 
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And there are other provisions in federal law, outside 
of PASPA, aimed at protecting the integrity of sports from the 
pall of wagering and that further demonstrate the federal 
policy of disfavoring sports-gambling.  Indeed, in enacting 
PASPA, Congress explicitly noted that the law was 
“complementary to and consistent with [then] current Federal 
law” with respect to sports wagering.  Senate Report at 3557.  
Congress has, for example, criminalized attempts to fix the 
outcome of a sporting event, 18 U.S.C. § 224, barred the 
placement of a sports gambling bet through wire 
                                                                                                     
it was not raised by the United States below.  But it is 
axiomatic that we may affirm on any ground apparent on the 
record, particularly when considering de novo the 
constitutionally of a Congressional enactment.  The United 
States may decide not to advance particular arguments, but 
we may not, consistent with our duty to “save and not to 
destroy,” Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 30, use that 
choice to declare unconstitutional an act of Congress.  The 
same may be said of arguments that the United States and the 
Leagues’ reading of PASPA has changed throughout the 
litigation and should therefore be discounted, see, e.g., Oral 
Arg. Tr. 71:14-19 (June 26, 2013). 
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communications to or from a place where such bets are 
illegal, 18 U.S.C. § 1084, and proscribed interstate 
transportation of means for carrying out sports lotteries, 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1301, 1307(d).
17
 
Appellants contend that Congress has not preempted 
state law but instead incorporated it to the extent certain 
prohibitions are tied to whatever is legal under state law.  But 
PASPA itself is not tied to state law.  Rather, PASPA 
                                              
17
  Appellants point to a statement in the Senate Report 
wherein the Committee notes that, according to the 
Congressional Budget Office, there would be “no cost to the 
federal government . . . from enactment of this bill,” Senate 
Report at 3561, as proof that PASPA seeks to foist upon the 
states the responsibility for banning sports wagering.  But this 
statement is taken out of context.  The import of it was that 
PASPA would require no “direct spending or receipts” of 
funds, id., but the Senate Report itself makes clear that the 
Justice Department would use already-earmarked funds to 
permit it to “enforce the law without utilizing criminal 
prosecutions of State officials,” id. at 3557.  For a report 
issued well before the opinions in New York and Printz 
delineated the contours of modern anti-commandeering 
jurisprudence, the Senate Report is remarkably clear in that it 
seeks to increase the federal government’s role in policing 
sports wagering, not pass that obligation along to the states.  
91 
 
prohibits engaging in schemes pursuant to state law.  28 
U.S.C. § 3702(2).  To be sure, some of the other cited 
provisions tie themselves to state law—but the Tenth 
Amendment does not require that Congress leave less room 
for the states to govern.  Cf. F.E.R.C., 456 U.S. at 764 (noting 
that there is no Tenth Amendment problem if Congress 
“allow[s] the States to enter the field if they promulgate[] 
regulations consistent with federal standards”).   
Appellants also attempt to distinguish PASPA from 
other preemptive schemes.  They note that preemptive 
schemes normally either impose an affirmative federal 
standard or a rule of non-regulation, and that PASPA does not 
impose an affirmative federal standard and cannot possibly be 
construed as a law aimed at permitting unregulated sports 
gambling because its aim was to stop the spread of sports 
gambling.  But, PASPA’s text and legislative history reflect 
that its goal is more modest—to ban gambling pursuant to a 
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state scheme—because Congress was concerned that state-
sponsored gambling carried with it a label of legitimacy that 
would make the activity appealing.  Whatever else we may 
think were Congress’ secret intentions in enacting PASPA, 
nothing we know of speaks to a desire to ban all sports 
wagering.  Moreover, the argument once again ignores that 
PASPA does impose a federal standard directly on private 
individuals, telling them, essentially, thou shall not engage in 
sports wagering under the auspices of a state-issued license.  
See 28 U.S.C. § 3702(2). 
* * * 
 We hold that PASPA does not violate the anti-
commandeering doctrine.  Although many of the principles 
set forth in anti-commandeering cases may abstractly be used 
to support Appellants’ position, doing so would result in an 
undue expansion of the anti-commandeering doctrine.  If 
attempting to influence the way states govern private parties, 
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or requiring the expenditure of resources, or giving the states 
hard choices, were enough to violate anti-commandeering 
principles, then what of Hodel, F.E.R.C., Baker, and Reno?  
The overriding of contrary state law via the Supremacy 
Clause may result in influencing or changing state policies, 
but there is nothing in the anti-commandeering cases to 
suggest that the principle is meant to apply when a law 
merely operates via the Supremacy Clause to invalidate 
contrary state action.  Missing here is an affirmative 
command that the states enact or carry out a federal scheme 
and PASPA is simply nothing like the only two laws struck 
down under the anti-commandeering principle.  Several 
important points buttress our conclusion: first, PASPA 
operates simply as a law of pre-emption, via the Supremacy 
Clause; second, PASPA thus only stops the states from doing 
something; and, finally, PASPA’s policy of stopping state-
sanctioned sports gambling is confirmed by the independent 
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prohibition on private activity pursuant to any such law.  
When so understood, it is clear that PASPA does not 
commandeer the states. 
C. Whether PASPA Violates the Equal Sovereignty of 
the States 
 Finally, we address Appellants’ contention that 
PASPA violates the equal sovereignty of the states by 
singling out Nevada for preferential treatment and allowing 
only that State to maintain broad state-sponsored sports 
gambling.   
 1. Equal Sovereignty Cases—Northwest Austin 
and Shelby County 
 The centerpiece of Appellants’ equal sovereignty 
argument is the Supreme Court’s analysis of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”) in Northwest Austin Municipal 
Utility District Number One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009), 
and Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 
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(2013).  In Northwest Austin, the Supreme Court was asked 
by a small utility district to rule on the constitutionality of § 5 
of the VRA, which required the district to obtain preclearance 
from federal authorities before it could make changes to the 
manner in which its board was elected.  The district had 
sought an exemption from the preclearance requirement, but 
the district court held that only states are eligible for such 
“bailouts” under the Act.  Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 196-97.  
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court stated that § 5 raises 
“federalism concerns” because it “differentiates between the 
States.”  Id. at 203.  The Court also explained that 
“[d]istinctions [between the states] can be justified in some 
cases” such as when Congress enacts “remedies for local 
evils which have subsequently appeared.”  Id. (citing South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328-29 (1966)).  
However, the Court did not ultimately decide whether § 5 
violated the equal sovereignty principle, invoking instead the 
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canon of constitutional avoidance to construe the VRA’s 
bailout provision to permit the district to obtain an exemption.  
Id. at 205. 
 In Shelby County, when asked to revisit the 
constitutionality of § 5, the Court reiterated the “basic 
principles” of equal sovereignty set forth in Northwest Austin 
and invalidated § 4(b) of the VRA, which set forth a formula 
used to determine what jurisdictions are covered by § 5 
preclearance.  133 S. Ct. at 2622, 2630-31.  Nevertheless, § 5 
once more survived despite the expressed equal sovereignty 
concerns.  Id. at 2631.   
Appellants ask that we leverage these statements to 
strike down all of PASPA because it permits Nevada to 
license sports gambling.  We decline to do so.  First, the VRA 
is fundamentally different from PASPA.  It represents, as the 
Supreme Court explained, “an uncommon exercise of 
congressional power” in an area “the Framers of the 
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Constitution intended the States to keep for themselves . . . 
the power to regulate elections.”  Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 
2623, 2624.  The regulation of gambling via the Commerce 
Clause is thus not of the same nature as the regulation of 
elections pursuant to the Reconstruction Amendments.  
Indeed, while the guarantee of uniformity in treatment 
amongst the states cabins some of Congress’ powers, see, 
e.g., U.S. CONST., art. I., § 8, cl. 1 (requiring uniformity in 
duties and imposts); id. § 9, cl. 6 (requiring uniformity in 
regulation of state ports), no such guarantee limits the 
Commerce Clause.  This only makes sense: Congress’ 
exercises of Commerce Clause authority are aimed at matters 
of national concern and finding national solutions will 
necessarily affect states differently; accordingly, the 
Commerce Clause, “[u]nlike other powers of [C]ongress[,] . . 
. does not require geographic uniformity.”  Morgan v. 
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Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 388 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring).   
Second, New Jersey would have us hold that laws 
treating states differently can “only” survive if they are meant 
to “remedy local evils” in a manner that is “sufficiently 
related to the problem that it targets.”  N.J. Br. at 55.  This 
position is overly broad in that it requires the existence of a 
one-size-fits-all test for equal sovereignty analysis, which, as 
the foregoing shows, is a perilous proposition in the context 
of the Commerce Clause.  And Northwest Austin’s statement 
that equal sovereignty may yield when local evils appear was 
made immediately after the statement that regulatory 
“[d]istinctions can be justified in some cases.”  557 U.S. at 
203 (emphasis added).  Thus, local evils appear to be but one 
of the types of cases in which a departure from the equal 
sovereignty principle is permitted.   
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Third, there is nothing in Shelby County to indicate 
that the equal sovereignty principle is meant to apply with the 
same force outside the context of “sensitive areas of state and 
local policymaking.”  Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2624.  We 
“had best respect what the [Court’s] majority says rather than 
read between the lines. . . . If the Justices are pulling our leg, 
let them say so.”  Sherman v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. 21 of 
Wheeling Twp., 980 F.2d 437, 448 (7th Cir. 1992).   
 Fourth, even accepting that the equal sovereignty 
principle applies in the same manner in the context of 
Commerce Clause legislation, we have no trouble concluding 
that PASPA passes muster.  Appellants’ argument that 
PASPA’s exemption does not properly remedy local evils 
because it “target[ed] the States in which legal sports 
wagering was absent,” N.J. Br. at 56 (emphasis omitted), 
again distorts PASPA’s purpose as being to wipe out sports 
gambling altogether.  When the true purpose is considered—
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to stop the spread of state-sanctioned sports gambling—it is 
clear that regulating states in which sports-wagering already 
existed would have been irrational.  Targeting only states 
where the practice did not exist is thus more than sufficiently 
related to the problem, it is precisely tailored to address the 
problem.  If anything, Appellants’ quarrel seems to be with 
PASPA’s actual goal rather than with the manner in which it 
operates. 
 Finally, Appellants ignore another feature that 
distinguishes PASPA from the VRA—that far from singling 
out a handful of states for disfavored treatment, PASPA treats 
more favorably a single state.  Indeed, it is noteworthy that 
Appellants do not ask us to invalidate § 3704(a)(2), the 
Nevada grandfathering provision that supposedly creates the 
equal sovereignty problem.  Instead, we are asked to strike 
down § 3702, PASPA’s general prohibition on state-licensed 
sports gambling.  Appellants do not explain why, if PASPA’s 
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preferential treatment of Nevada violates the equal-
sovereignty doctrine, the solution is not to strike down only 
that exemption.  The remedy New Jersey seeks—a complete 
invalidation of PASPA—does far more violence to the 
statute, and would be a particularly odd result given the law’s 
purpose of curtailing state-licensed gambling on sports.  That 
New Jersey seeks Nevada’s preferential treatment, and not a 
complete ban on the preferences, undermines Appellants’ 
invocation of the equal sovereignty doctrine. 
 2. Grandfathering Clause Cases 
Appellants also argue that PASPA’s exemption for 
Nevada is invalid under the Supreme Court’s analysis in City 
of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976), and 
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. 456 (1981), of 
grandfathering provisions in economic legislation.  But in 
both cases the Supreme Court upheld the provisions: in 
Dukes, an ordinance that banned push cart vendors from New 
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Orleans’ historic district, but grandfathered those of a certain 
vintage, 427 U.S. at 305; in Clover Leaf, a statute banning the 
sale of milk in non-recyclable containers but grandfathering 
non-recyclable paper containers, 449 U.S. at 469. 
Two cases upholding economic ordinances aimed at 
private parties have little to say about state sovereignty.  
While Appellants contend that Dukes and Clover Leaf 
Creamery support their position because they upheld 
temporary grandfathering clauses, there was no indication in 
either case that the clauses upheld were indeed temporary, 
that the legislatures were obligated to rescind them in the 
future, or even that the supposedly temporal quality of the 
laws was the basis of the Court’s holdings, other than a 
statement in passing in Dukes that the legislature had chosen 
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to “initially” target only a particular class of products. 427 
U.S. at 305.
18
  
Appellants note that there is no case where a court has 
“permitted a grandfathering rationale to serve as a 
justification for violating the fundamental principle of equal 
sovereignty.”  N.J. Br. at 59.  But it is not hard to see why this 
is the case: only two Supreme Court cases in modern times 
have applied the equal sovereignty principle.
19
   
                                              
18
  Nor does our decision in Delaware River Basin 
Commission v. Bucks County Water & Sewer Authority 
support the notion that permanent grandfathering clauses are 
invalid, given that in that case we simply remanded for 
development of a record as to why the law at issue contained 
a grandfathering provision.  641 F.2d 1087, 1096-98 (3d Cir. 
1981).  PASPA’s legislative history is clear as to the purpose 
behind its own exemptions, and thus survives Delaware River 
Basin.   
 
19
  Appellants also rely on the so-called “equal footing” 
principle, the notion that Congress may not burden a new 
state’s entry into the Union by disfavoring them over other 
states in support of their attack on Nevada’s exemption.  See, 
e.g., Escanaba & Lake Mich. Transp. v. Chicago, 107 U.S. 
678, 689 (1883) (explaining that whatever restriction may 
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V. CONCLUSION 
If baseball is a game of inches, constitutional 
adjudication may be described as a matter of degrees.  The 
questions we have addressed are in many ways sui generis.  
Neither the standing nor the merits issues we have tackled 
permit an easy solution by resorting to a controlling case that 
provides a definitive “Eureka!” moment.  Our role thus is to 
distill an answer from precedent and the principles embodied 
therein.  But we are confident that our adjudication of this 
dispute and our resolution of its merits leave us well within 
the strict bounds set forth by the Constitution and preserves 
intact the state-federal balance of power. 
                                                                                                     
have been imposed over Illinois’ ability to regulate the 
operation of bridges over the Chicago River, such restrictions 
disappeared once Illinois was admitted into the Union as a 
state); Coyle, 221 U.S. at 567 (holding that Congress may not 
require Oklahoma to not change its capital as a condition of 
admission into the Union).  But PASPA does not speak to 
conditions of admission into the Union. 
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Having examined the difficult legal issues raised by 
the parties, we hold that nothing in PASPA violates the U.S. 
Constitution.  The law neither exceeds Congress’ enumerated 
powers nor violates any principle of federalism implicit in the 
Tenth Amendment or anywhere else in our Constitutional 
structure.  The heart of Appellants’ constitutional attack on 
PASPA is their reliance on two doctrines that—while of 
undeniable importance—have each only been used to strike 
down notably intrusive and, indeed, extraordinary federal 
laws.  Extending these principles as Appellants propose 
would result in significant changes to the day-to-day 
operation of the Supremacy Clause in our constitutional 
structure.  Moreover, we see much daylight between the 
exceedingly intrusive statutes invalidated in the anti-
commandeering cases and PASPA’s much more 
straightforward mechanism of stopping the states from 
lending their imprimatur to gambling on sports.   
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New Jersey and any other state that may wish to 
legalize gambling on sports within their borders are not left 
without redress.  Just as PASPA once gave New Jersey 
preferential treatment in the context of gambling on sports, 
Congress may again choose to do so or, more broadly, may 
choose to undo PASPA altogether.  It is not our place to usurp 
Congress’ role simply because PASPA may have become an 
unpopular law.  The forty-nine states that do not enjoy 
PASPA’s solicitude may easily invoke Congress’ authority 
should they so desire.     
 The District Court’s judgment is AFFIRMED. 
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Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, et al. v. Governor of the State of N.J., et al., Nos. 13-
1713, 13-1714, 13-1715 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
I agree with my colleagues that the Leagues have standing to challenge New 
Jersey’s Sports Wagering Law, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:12A-2,  and that the Professional and 
Amateur Sports Protection Act (“PASPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 3702, does not violate the 
principle of “equal sovereignty.”  I therefore join parts III and IV.C of the majority’s 
decision in full.  I also agree that, ordinarily, Congress has the authority to regulate 
gambling pursuant to the Commerce Clause, and thus I join part IV.A of the majority 
opinion as well.  Yet, PASPA is no ordinary federal statute that directly regulates 
interstate commerce or activities substantially affecting such commerce.  Instead, PASPA 
prohibits states from authorizing sports gambling and thereby directs how states must 
treat such activity.  Indeed, according to my colleagues, PASPA essentially gives the 
states the choice of allowing totally unregulated betting on sporting events or prohibiting 
all such gambling.  Because this congressional directive violates the principles of 
federalism as articulated by the Supreme Court in United States v. New York, 505 U.S. 
142 (1992), and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), I respectfully dissent from 
that part of the majority’s opinion that upholds PASPA as a constitutional exercise of 
congressional authority. 
I. 
I agree with my colleagues that an appropriate starting point for addressing 
Appellants’ claims is Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 
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264 (1981).  In Hodel, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of the federal Surface 
Mining Control and Reclamation Act, a comprehensive statutory scheme designed to 
regulate against the harmful effects of surface coal mining.  Id. at 268.  The act permitted 
states that wished to exercise permanent regulatory authority over surface coal mining to 
submit plans that met federal standards for federal approval.  Id. at 271.  In addition, the 
federal government created a federal enforcement program for states that did not obtain 
federal approval for state plans.  Id. at 272.  Applying the framework set forth in the 
since-overruled case, National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled 
by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985),  the Court 
concluded that the act did not regulate “‘States as States’” because the challenged 
provisions governed only private individuals’ and business’ activities and because “the 
States are not compelled to enforce the . . . standards, to expend any state funds, or to 
participate in the federal regulatory program in any manner whatsoever.”  Id. at 287-88.  
The Court further explained that 
[i]f a State does not wish to submit a proposed permanent 
program that complies with the Act and implementing 
regulations, the full regulatory burden will be borne by the 
Federal Government.  Thus, there can be no suggestion that 
the Act commandeers the legislative processes of the States 
by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal 
regulatory program. 
 
Id. at 288.  Even post-Garcia, the Court has explained that the act at issue in Hodel 
presented no Tenth Amendment problem “because it merely made compliance with 
federal standards a precondition to continued state regulation in an otherwise pre-empted 
field.”  Printz, 521 U.S. at 926. 
3 
 
As the majority points out, a year later, in FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 
(1982), the Court upheld the constitutionality of two titles of the Public Utility 
Regulatory Policies Act (“PURPA”), which directed state regulatory authorities to 
“consider” certain standards and approaches to regulate energy and prescribed certain 
procedures, but did not require the state authorities to adopt or implement specified 
standards.  Id. at 745-50.  As in Hodel, the Court observed that Congress had authority to 
preempt the field at issue—in FERC’s case, energy regulation.  Id. at 765.  The Court 
explained: 
PURPA should not be invalid simply because, out of 
deference to state authority, Congress adopted a less intrusive 
scheme and allowed the States to continue regulating in the 
area on the condition that they consider the suggested federal 
standards.  While the condition here is affirmative in nature—
that is, it directs the States to entertain proposals—nothing in 
this Court’s cases suggests that the nature of the condition 
makes it a constitutionally improper one.  There is nothing in 
PURPA “directly compelling” the States to enact a legislative 
program.  In short, because the two challenged Titles simply 
condition continued state involvement in a pre-emptible area 
on the consideration of federal proposals, they do not threaten 
the States’ “separate and independent existence,” Lane 
County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71, 76, 19 L.Ed. 101 (1869); Coyle 
v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 580, 31 S.Ct. 688, 695, 55 L.Ed. 
853 (1911), and do not impair the ability of the States “to 
function effectively in a federal system.”  Fry v. United 
States, 421 U.S., at 547, n.7, 95 S.Ct., at 1795, n.7; National 
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S., at 852, 96 S.Ct., at 2474.  
To the contrary, they offer the States a vehicle for remaining 
active in an area of overriding concern. 
 
Id. at 765-66. 
Subsequently, the Supreme Court struck down provisions in two cases based on 
violations of federalism principles.  At issue in the first case, New York, was a federal 
4 
 
statute that intended to incentivize “States to provide for the disposal of low level 
radioactive waste generated within their borders.”  New York, 505 U.S. at 170.  As “an 
alternative to regulating pursuant to Congress’ direction,” one of the “incentives” 
provided states the “option of taking title to and possession of the low level radioactive 
waste . . . and becoming liable for all damages waste generators suffer[ed] as a result of 
the State’s failure to do so promptly.”  Id. at 174-75.  At the outset, the Court 
characterized the issue before it as “concern[ing] the circumstances under which 
Congress may use the State as implements of regulation; that is, whether Congress may 
direct or otherwise motivate the States to regulate in a particular field or a particular 
way.”  Id. at 161. 
The Court in New York held the “take title” provision unconstitutional because it 
“‘commandeer[ed] the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to 
enact and enforce a federal regulatory program’” in violation of the principles of 
federalism.   Id. at 176 (quoting Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288).  The Court explained that “even 
where Congress has the authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or 
prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power directly to compel the States to require or 
prohibit those acts.”  Id. at 166 (emphasis added).  It further elaborated that “[t]he 
allocation of power contained in the Commerce Clause, for example, authorizes Congress 
to regulate interstate commerce directly; it does not authorize Congress to regulate state 
governments’ regulation of interstate commerce.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 Second, in Printz, the Court reviewed a temporary federal statutory provision that 
required certain state law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on 
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potential handgun purchasers as part of a federal regulatory scheme.  Printz, 521 U.S. at 
903-04.  Observing that “‘[t]he Federal Government may not compel the States to enact 
or administer a federal regulatory program,’” id. at 933 (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 
188), the Court held that “Congress cannot circumvent that prohibition by conscripting 
the State’s officers directly.”  Id. at 935.  The Court further explained that Congress 
categorically “may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular 
problems, nor command the States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to 
administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.”  Id. 
Later, in Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000), a case the majority regards as 
“remarkably similar” to the matter sub judice, (Maj. Op. 43), a unanimous Court held that 
the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (“DPPA”), a generally applicable law which 
regulates the disclosure and resale by states and private persons of personal information 
contained in state department of motor vehicle records, “did not run afoul of the 
federalism principles enunciated in New York . . . and Printz.”  Id. at 143, 146, 151.  After 
first determining that the DPPA was a proper exercise of congressional authority under 
the Commerce Clause, the Court rejected South Carolina’s argument that the act violated 
federalism principles because it would “require time and effort on the part of state 
employees.”  Id. at 148, 150.  Finding New York and Printz inapplicable, the Court relied 
instead on South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988),
1
 which “upheld a statute that 
prohibited States from issuing unregistered bonds because the law ‘regulate[d] state 
                                              
1
 The majority also characterizes Baker as “remarkably similar” to PASPA’s 
prohibition of state action.  (Maj. Op. 43.) 
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activities,’ rather than ‘seeking[ing] to control or influence the manner in which States 
regulate private parties.’”  Reno, 528 U.S. at 150 (quoting Baker, 485 U.S. at 514-15).2  
The Court further explained: 
The DPPA does not require the States in their sovereign 
capacity to regulate their own citizens.  The DPPA regulates 
the States as the owners of data bases.  It does not require the 
South Carolina Legislature to enact any laws or regulations, 
and it does not require state officials to assist in the 
enforcement of federal statutes regulating private individuals. 
 
Id. at 151. 
Most recently, in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. 
Ct. 2566 (2012), the Court struck down, as violative of the Spending Clause, a provision 
in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) that would have withheld 
federal Medicaid grants to states unless they expanded their Medicaid eligibility 
requirements in accordance with conditions in the ACA.  Id. at 2581-82, 2606-07 
                                              
2
 In Baker, the Court observed: 
The [intervenor] nonetheless contends that § 310 has 
commandeered the state legislative and administrative 
process because many state legislatures had to amend a 
substantial number of statutes in order to issue bonds in 
registered form and because state officials had to devote 
substantial effort to determine how best to implement a 
registered bond system. Such “commandeering” is, however, 
an inevitable consequence of regulating a state activity. Any 
federal regulation demands compliance.  That a State wishing 
to engage in certain activity must take administrative and 
sometimes legislative action to comply with federal standards 
regulating that activity is a commonplace that presents no 
constitutional defect. 
Baker, 485 U.S. at 514-15. 
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(plurality).  Quoting New York, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for a three-justice plurality, 
observed that “‘the Constitution has never been understood to confer upon Congress the 
ability to require the States to govern according to Congress’ instructions.’”  Id. at 2602 
(quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 162).  The plurality then explained that, based on that 
principle, New York and Printz had struck down federal statutes that “commandeer[ed] a 
State’s legislative or administrative apparatus for federal purposes.”  Id.  The plurality 
also noted that, within the authority of the Spending Clause, Congress may not create 
“inducements to exert a power akin to undue influence” where “pressure [would] turn[] 
into compulsion.”  Id. (internal quotations omitted).  Recognizing that “‘[t]he 
Constitution simply does not give Congress the authority to require the States to 
regulate,’” the plurality observed that “[t]hat is true whether Congress directly commands 
a State to regulate or indirectly coerces a State to adopt a federal regulatory system of its 
own.”  Id. (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 178).  The plurality ultimately concluded that 
the Medicaid conditions were unduly coercive and reiterated that “Congress may not 
simply ‘conscript state [agencies] into the national bureaucratic army.’”  Id. at 2604, 
2606-07 (quoting FERC, 456 U.S. at 775 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment in part 
and dissenting in part)). 
 While Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion concerning the Medicaid expansion 
provisions in Sebelius garnered the signatures of only three justices, the four dissenting 
justices also invoked the federalism principles of New York in concluding that the 
funding conditions in the Medicaid expansion impermissibly compelled states to govern 
as directed by Congress by coercing states’ participation in the expanded program.  Id. at 
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2660-62 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).  Thus, seven justices 
found the Medicaid expansion unconstitutional, citing the federalism principles 
articulated in New York as part of the basis for their conclusion.  Importantly, the seven-
justice rejection of the Medicaid expansion based, in part, on New York, represents a clear 
signal from the Court that the principles enunciated in New York are not limited to a 
narrow class of cases in which Congress specifically directs a state legislature to 
affirmatively enact legislation.  Cf. United States v. Richardson, 658 F.3d 333, 340 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (observing that even if not binding due to the votes of a splintered Court, “the 
collective view of [a majority of] justices is, of course, persuasive authority”).  
II. 
 New York and Printz clearly established that the federal government cannot direct 
state legislatures to enact legislation and state officials to implement federal policy.  It is 
true that the two particular statutes under review in those cases involved congressional 
commands that states affirmatively enact legislation, see New York, 505 U.S. at 176-77, 
or affirmatively enforce a federal regulatory scheme, see Printz, 521 U.S. at 935.  
Nothing in New York or Printz, however, limited the principles of federalism upon which 
those cases relied to situations in which Congress directed affirmative activity on the part 
of the states.  Rather, the general principle articulated by the Court in New York was that 
even where Congress has the authority under the Constitution 
to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the 
power directly to compel the States to require or prohibit 
those acts. The allocation of power contained in the 
Commerce Clause, for example, authorizes Congress to 
regulate interstate commerce directly; it does not authorize 
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Congress to regulate state governments’ regulation of 
interstate commerce. 
 
New York, 505 U.S. at 166 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  Here, it cannot be 
disputed that PASPA “regulate[s] state governments’ regulation of interstate commerce.”  
See id.  States regulate gambling, in part, by licensing or authorizing such activity.  By 
prohibiting states from licensing or authorizing sports gambling, PASPA dictates the 
manner in which states must regulate interstate commerce and thus contravenes the 
principles of federalism set forth in New York and Printz.
3
 
 If the objective of the federal government is to require states to regulate in a 
manner that effectuates federal policy, any distinction between a federal directive that 
commands states to take affirmative action and one that prohibits states from exercising 
their sovereignty is illusory.  Whether stated as a command to engage in specific action or 
as a prohibition against specific action, the federal government’s interference with a 
state’s sovereign autonomy is the same.  Moreover, the recognition of such a distinction 
is untenable, as affirmative commands to engage in certain conduct can be rephrased as a 
prohibition against not engaging in that conduct.  Surely the structure of Our Federalism 
does not turn on the phraseology used by Congress in commanding the states how to 
                                              
3
  I agree with my colleagues that Congress has the authority under the Commerce 
Clause to ban gambling on sporting events, and that such a ban could include state-
licensed gambling.  I part company with my colleagues because that is not what PASPA 
does.  Instead, PASPA conscripts the states as foot soldiers to implement a congressional 
policy choice that wagering on sporting events should be prohibited to the greatest extent 
practicable.  Contrary to the majority’s view, the Supremacy Clause simply does not give 
Congress the power to tell the states what they can and cannot do in the absence of a 
validly-enacted federal regulatory or deregulatory scheme.  As explained at pages 13-14, 
infra, there is no federal regulatory or deregulatory scheme on the matter of sports 
wagering.  Instead, there is the congressional directive that states not allow it. 
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regulate.  An interpretation of federalism principles that permits congressional negative 
commands to state governments will eviscerate the constitutional lines drawn in New 
York and Printz that recognized the limit to Congress’s power to compel state 
instrumentalities to carry out federal policy. 
 In addition, PASPA implicates the political accountability concerns voiced by the 
Supreme Court in New York and Printz.  In New York, the Court observed that when the 
federal government preempts an area with a federal law to impose its view on an issue, it 
“makes the decision in full view of the public, and it will be federal officials that suffer 
the consequences if the decision turns out to be detrimental or unpopular.”  New York, 
505 U.S. at 168.  In contrast, the Court explained, “where the Federal Government directs 
the States to regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public 
disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain 
insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision.”  Id. at 169.  The Court also 
recognized in Printz that in situations where Congress compels state officials to 
“implement[] a federal regulatory program, Members of Congress can take credit for 
‘solving’ problems without having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with 
higher federal taxes” and that states “are . . . put in the position of taking the blame for 
[the federal program’s] burdensomeness and for its defects.”  Printz, 521 U.S. at 930.  
Although PASPA does not “direct[] the States to regulate,” New York, 505 U.S. at 169, or 
“implement[] a federal regulatory program,” Printz, 521 U.S. at 930, its prohibition on 
state authorization and licensing of sports gambling similarly diminishes the 
accountability of federal officials at the expense of state officials.  Instead of directly 
11 
 
regulating or banning sports gambling, Congress passed the responsibility to the states, 
which, under PASPA, may not authorize or issue state licenses for such activities.  New 
Jersey law regulates games of chance, see N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:8-1, et seq., state lotteries, 
see id. § 5:9-1, et seq., and casino gambling within the state, see id. § 5:12-1, et seq.  As a 
result, it would be natural for New Jersey citizens to believe that state law governs sports 
gambling as well.  That belief would be further supported by the fact that the voters of 
New Jersey recently passed a state constitutional amendment permitting sports gambling 
and their representatives in the state legislature subsequently enacted the Sports 
Wagering Law, at issue here, to regulate such activity.  When New Jersey fails to 
authorize or license sports gambling, its citizens will understandably blame state officials 
even though state regulation of gambling has become a puppet of the federal government, 
whose strings are in reality pulled (or cut) by PASPA.  States can authorize and regulate 
some forms of gambling, e.g., lotteries and casinos, but not other forms of gambling to 
implement policy choices made by Congress.  Thus, accountability concerns arising from 
PASPA’s restraint on state regulation also counsel in favor of concluding that it violates 
principles of federalism. 
I do not suggest that the federal government may not prohibit certain actions by 
state governments—indeed it can.  If Congress identifies a problem that falls within its 
realm of authority, it may provide a federal solution directly itself or properly incentivize 
states to regulate or comply with federal standards.  For example, if Congress chooses to 
regulate (or deregulate) directly, it may require states to refrain from enacting their own 
regulations that, in Congress’s judgment, would thwart its policy objectives.  Illustrating 
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this point, the Supreme Court held in Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 
(1992), that the federal Airline Deregulation Act, which “prohibit[ed] the States from 
enforcing any law ‘relating to rates, routes, or services’ of any air carrier” preempted 
guidelines regarding fair advertising set forth by an organization of state attorneys 
general.  Id. at 378-79, 391.  There, as the Court explained, the purpose of the federal 
prohibition against further state regulation was “[t]o ensure that the States would not 
undo federal deregulation with regulation of their own.”  Id. at 378.  Thus, a state law 
contrary to a federal regulatory or deregulatory scheme is void under the Supremacy 
Clause.
4
 
Unlike in Morales and other preemption cases in which federal legislation limits 
the actions of state governments, in this case, there is no federal scheme regulating or 
deregulating sports gambling by which to preempt state regulation.  PASPA provides no 
federal regulatory standards or requirements of its own.  Instead, it simply prohibits states 
from “sponsor[ing], operat[ing], advertis[ing], promot[ing], licens[ing], or authoriz[ing]” 
gambling on sports.  28 U.S.C. § 3702(1).  And, PASPA certainly cannot be said to be a 
deregulatory measure, as its purpose was to stem the spread of state-sponsored sports 
gambling, not let it go unregulated.
5
  See S. Rep. No. 102-248, at 3 (1991) (“The purpose 
                                              
4
  Significantly, the majority opinion does not cite any case that sustained a federal 
statute that purported to regulate the states under the Commerce Clause where there was 
no underlying federal scheme of regulation or deregulation.  In this sense, PASPA stands 
alone in telling the states that they may not regulate an aspect of interstate commerce that  
Congress believes should be prohibited.   
 
5
  The majority reasons that PASPA does not commandeer the states in battling 
sports gambling because the states retain the choice of repealing their laws outlawing 
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of  S. 474 is to prohibit sports gambling conducted by, or authorized under the law of, 
any State or other governmental entity.”); id. at 4 (“Senate bill 474 serves an important 
public purpose, to stop the spread of State-sponsored sports gambling . . . .”). 
Moreover, contrary to the majority opinion’s suggestion, other federal statutes 
relating to sports gambling do not aggregate to form the foundation of a federal 
regulatory scheme that can be interpreted as preempting state regulation of sports 
gambling.  First, Section 1084 of Title 18 of the United States Code makes it a federal 
crime to use wire communications to transmit sports bets in interstate commerce unless 
the transmission is from and to a state where sports betting is legal.  See 18 U.S.C. § 
1084(a)-(b).  Thus, under that section, state law, rather than federal law, determines 
whether the specified conduct falls within the criminal statute.
6
  Second, another federal 
law prohibits any “scheme . . . to influence . . . by bribery any sporting contest.”  Id. § 
224(a).  But, that same section expressly indicates that it “shall not be construed as 
indicating an intent on the part of Congress to occupy the field in which this section 
operations to the exclusion of any State,” and further disavows any attempt to preempt 
otherwise valid state laws.  Id. § 224(b).  A third federal statute carves out an exception to 
the general federal prohibition against transporting or mailing material and broadcasting 
information relating to lotteries for those conducted or authorized by states.  Id. § 
                                                                                                                                                  
such activity, observing that PASPA does not “require[] that the states keep any law in 
place.”  (Maj. Op. at 39.)  Contrary to the majority’s supposition, it certainly is open to 
debate whether a state’s repeal of a ban on sports gambling would be akin to that state’s 
“authorizing” gambling on sporting events, action that PASPA explicitly forecloses. 
   
6
 Accordingly, if a state repealed an existing ban on wagering on sporting events, 
federal law would not be implicated. 
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1307(a)-(b).  That exception, however, does not pertain to the transportation or mailing of 
“equipment, tickets, or material” for sports lotteries.  Id. § 1307(b), (d).  Thus, while state 
sports lotteries violate § 1307, that section does not provide a basis for inferring that it, 
together with PAPSA, provides a federal regulatory scheme that preempts state regulation 
of sports gambling by private parties.
7
  Further indicating federal deference to state laws 
on the subject, a fourth federal statute makes it a crime to transport wagering 
paraphernalia in interstate commerce but does not apply to betting materials to be used on 
sporting events in states where such betting is legal.  Id. § 1953(a)-(b).  As a result, the 
federal prohibition of state-authorized sports gambling does not emanate from a federal 
regulatory scheme that expressly or implicitly preempts state regulation that would 
conflict with federal policy.  Instead, PASPA attempts to implement federal policy by 
telling the states that they may not regulate an otherwise unregulated activity.  The 
Constitution affords Congress no such power.  See New York, 505 U.S. at 178 (“The 
Constitution . . . gives Congress the authority to regulate matters directly and to pre-empt 
contrary state regulation.  Where a federal interest is sufficiently strong to cause Congress 
to legislate, it must do so directly . . . .”).   
In addition to preempting state regulation with federal regulation, in some 
circumstances, Congress may regulate states directly as part of a generally applicable 
law.  See, e.g., New York, 505 U.S. at 160 (collecting cases).  That is what Congress did 
                                              
7
 PASPA only extends its prohibition to private persons to the extent persons 
“sponsor, operate, advertise, or promote [sports gambling] pursuant to the law or compact 
of a governmental entity.”  28 U.S.C. § 3702(2).  Because the federal statute applies only 
to persons who act pursuant to state law, it cannot be said to directly regulate persons.  
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with the DPPA, which the Court expressly found in Reno to be generally applicable.  See 
Reno, 528 U.S. at 151 (“[W]e need not address the question whether general applicability 
is a constitutional requirement for federal regulation of the States, because the DPPA is 
generally applicable.  The DPPA regulates the universe of entities that participate as 
suppliers to the market for motor vehicle information . . . .”).  Yet, unlike the DPPA in 
Reno, but like the act in New York, PASPA is not an example of a generally applicable 
law that subjects states to the same federal regulation as private parties.  See New York, 
505 U.S. at 160 (“This litigation presents no occasion to apply or revisit the holdings of . 
. . cases [concerning generally applicable laws], as this is not a case in which Congress 
has subjected a State to the same legislation applicable to private parties.”).  In addition 
to its restrictions on actions by state governments relating to sports gambling, PASPA 
also forbids “a person to sponsor, operate, advertise, or promote” sports gambling if done 
“pursuant to the law or compact of a governmental entity.”  18 U.S.C. § 3702(2) 
(emphasis added); see also supra note 2.  Thus, PASPA’s reach to private parties is 
predicated on a state’s authorization of sponsorship, operation, advertisement, or 
promotion of sports gambling pursuant to state law.
8
  Accordingly, PASPA cannot be 
said to “subject[] . . . States[s] to the same legislation applicable to private parties,” New 
York, 505 U.S. at 160, for state law determines whether § 3702(2) reaches any particular 
individual. 
                                              
8
 According to the majority, a state would presumably not run afoul of PASPA if it 
merely refused to prohibit sports gambling.  The resulting unregulated market, however, 
portends grave consequences for which state officials would be held accountable, even 
though it would be federal policy that prohibits the states from taking effective measures 
to regulate and police this activity.  In this sense, PASPA is indeed coercive. 
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Nor does Reno stand more generally for the proposition that a violation of “anti-
commandeering” federalism principles occurs only when Congress requires affirmative 
activity by state governments.  It is true that in upholding the DPPA, the Court noted that 
it “d[id] not require the South Carolina Legislature to enact any laws or regulations, and it 
d[id] not require state officials to assist in the enforcement of federal statutes regulating 
private individuals.”  Reno, 528 U.S. at 151.  Read in context, however, that statement 
does not suggest that the principles of federalism articulated in New York and Printz are 
limited only to situations in which Congress compels states to enact laws or enforce 
federal regulation.  The two sentences preceding that statement make that clear.  First, the 
Court recognized that “the DPPA d[id] not require the States in their sovereign capacity 
to regulate their own citizens.”  Id.  But here, PASPA does “require states in their 
sovereign capacity to regulate their own citizens,” id., because it dictates how they must 
regulate sports gambling.  Pursuant to PASPA, states may not “sponsor, operate, 
advertise, promote, license, or authorize” such activity, 28 U.S.C. § 3702(1).  Thus, states 
must govern accordingly, even if that means by refraining from providing a regulatory 
scheme that governs sports gambling. 
Second, the Court explained in Reno that, “[t]he DPPA regulates the States as 
owners of data bases” of personal information in motor vehicle records.  Reno, 528 U.S. 
at 151 (emphasis added).  The fact that the DPPA regulated states as “suppliers to the 
market for motor vehicle information,” id., clearly indicates that the Court viewed the 
DPPA as direct congressional regulation of interstate commerce, id. at 148 (recognizing 
that motor vehicle information, in the context of the DPPA, is “an article of commerce”), 
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rather than a federal requirement for the states to regulate such activity, see New York, 
505 U.S. at 166 (“The allocation of power contained in the Commerce Clause . . . 
authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce directly; it does not authorize 
Congress to regulate state governments’ regulation of interstate commerce.”).  Although 
the Court declined to find that New York and Printz governed the DPPA merely because 
it would “require time and effort on the part of state employees,” it clarified that federally 
mandated action by states to comply with federal regulations is not necessarily fatal to a 
federal law that “‘regulate[s] state activities,’ rather than ‘seek[ing ] to control or 
influence the manner in which States regulate private parties.’”  Reno, 528 U.S. at 150 
(quoting Baker, 485 U.S. at 514-15) (second alteration in original). 
The direct federal regulation of interstate commerce under the DPPA obviously 
distinguishes Reno from New York and Printz, where the federal statutes at issue in those 
cases required states to enact legislation and enforce federal policy, respectively.  But it 
also distinguishes Reno from this case.  As the Court recognized, “[t]he DPPA 
establishe[d] a regulatory scheme.”  Reno, 528 U.S. at 144, 148, 151.  As discussed 
above, however, PASPA is not itself a regulatory scheme, nor does it combine with 
several other scattered statutes in the criminal code to create a federal regulatory scheme.  
And while Congress could have regulated sports gambling directly under the Commerce 
Clause, just as it regulated motor vehicle information under the DPPA, it did not.  
Instead, it chose to set federal parameters as to how states may regulate sports gambling.  
As a result, any reliance on Reno to uphold PASPA is misplaced. 
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Hodel and FERC also provide no support for upholding PASPA.  In Hodel, the 
statute at issue permitted states to submit a state regulatory plan for federal approval if 
they wished to regulate surface coal mining; if states did not seek or obtain approval, then 
a federal enforcement program would take effect.  Hodel, 452 U.S. at 271-72.  The Court 
determined that the federal statute did not “commandeer[] the legislative process of the 
States” because states had a choice about whether to implement regulation that 
conformed to federal standards or let the federal government bear the burden of 
regulation.  Id. at 288; see also Printz, 521 U.S. at 925-26 (“In Hodel . . . we concluded 
that the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 did not present [a Tenth 
Amendment] problem . . . because it merely made compliance with federal standards a 
precondition to continued state regulation in an otherwise pre-empted field.” (citation 
omitted)).  If PASPA provided a similar choice to states—to either implement state 
regulation of sports gambling that met federal standards or allow federal regulation to 
take effect—then perhaps it would pass constitutional muster.  But it does not.  Therefore 
Hodel is inapplicable to the case at hand. 
In addition, in upholding Titles I and III of PURPA in FERC, the Court focused on 
the fact that those titles merely required that states “consider the suggested federal 
standards” as a condition to continued state regulation.  FERC, 456 U.S. at 765; see also 
id. at 765-66 (“In short, because the two challenged Titles simply condition continued 
state involvement in a pre-emptible area on the consideration of federal proposals, they 
do not threaten the States’ separate and independent existence, and do not impair the 
ability of the States to function effectively in a federal system.” (citations omitted) 
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(internal quotation marks omitted)).  Here, PASPA does not provide suggested federal 
standards and approaches that states must consider in their regulation of sports gambling.  
Rather, PASPA strips any regulatory choice from state governments.
9
  Furthermore, 
while the PURPA titles in FERC did “not involve the compelled exercise of Mississippi’s 
sovereign powers,” id. at 769, PASPA does indeed suffer from the obverse of such a 
constitutional defect: it prohibits the exercise of states’ sovereign powers.  FERC is thus 
distinguishable and inapposite. 
 Finally, as recognized by the majority, our decision in Office of the Commissioner 
of Baseball v. Markell, 579 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2009), does not bind us to reject a challenge 
to PASPA on federalism grounds.  In that case, we determined that a statutory phrase 
concerning the extent to which states grandfathered under PASPA could operate certain 
types of sports gambling was unambiguous.  Id. at 302-03.  As a result of the 
unambiguous language in PASPA, “we f[ou]nd unpersuasive Delaware’s argument that 
its sovereign status requires that it be permitted to implement its proposed betting 
scheme.”  Id. at 303.  That finding, however, related to our conclusion that PASPA gave 
clear notice of its “‘alter[ation] [of] the usual constitutional balance’ with respect to 
sports wagering,” and thus satisfied the requirement of Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 
(1991).  See Markell, 579 F.3d at 303.  Yet, here, we are not dealing with a question of 
                                              
9
  The majority asserts that the two “choices” presented to a state by PASPA – to 
“repeal its sports wagering ban [or] to keep a complete ban on sports wagering” – “leave 
much room for the states to make their own policy.”  (Maj. Op. at 41.)  Even if the 
majority’s reading of PASPA as affording these choices is correct, I fail to discern the 
“room” that is accorded the states to make their own policy on sports wagering.  It seems 
to me that the only choice is to allow for completely unregulated sports wagering (a result 
that Congress certainly did not intend to foster), or to ban sports wagering completely. 
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which sovereign—state or federal—has the authority under either the “usual” or “altered” 
constitutional balance to regulate sports gambling.  Congress does have the authority to 
regulate sports gambling when it does so itself.  In this case, however, we are faced with 
the issue of whether Congress has the authority to regulate how states regulate sports 
gambling.  Thus, our rejection of Delaware’s “sovereign status” argument has no bearing 
on the issue before us.  Furthermore, Markell provides no guidance in this case, because 
there we addressed only the meaning of the statutory exception to PASPA relating to 
grandfathered states found at 28 U.S.C. § 3704(a)(1).  Markell, 579 F.3d. at 300-01.  We 
did not pass upon the issue of whether Congress may constitutionally restrict how states 
can regulate under § 3702(1).  
 In sum, no case law supports permitting Congress to achieve federal policy 
objectives by dictating how states regulate sports gambling.  Instead of directly regulating 
state activities or interstate commerce, PASPA “seek[s] to control or influence the 
manner in which States regulate private parties,” a distinction the Supreme Court has 
recognized as significant.  See Reno, 528 U.S. at 150 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(“In Baker, we upheld a statute that prohibited States from issuing unregistered bonds 
because the law ‘regulate[d] state activities,’ rather than ‘seek[ing] to control or influence 
the manner in which States regulate private parties.’” (quoting Baker, 485 U.S. at 514-
15)); see also New York, 505 U.S at 166 (“The allocation of power contained in the 
Commerce Clause . . . authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce directly; it 
does not authorize Congress to regulate state governments’ regulation of interstate 
commerce.”). 
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Moreover, no legal principle exists for finding a distinction between the federal 
government compelling state governments to exercise their sovereignty to enact or 
enforce laws on the one hand, and restricting state governments from exercising their 
sovereignty to enact or enforce laws on the other.  In both scenarios the federal 
government is regulating how states regulate.  If Congress identifies a problem involving 
or affecting interstate commerce and wishes to provide a policy solution, it may regulate 
the commercial activity itself, see New York, 505 U.S. at 166, and may even regulate state 
activity that involves interstate commerce, see Reno, 528 U.S. at 150-51; Baker, 485 U.S. 
at 514.  In addition, Congress may provide states a choice about whether to implement 
state regulations consistent with federal standards or let federal regulation preempt state 
law, see Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288, and may require states to “consider” federal standards or 
approaches to regulation in deciding how to regulate in a preemptible area, see FERC, 
456 U.S. at 765-66.  Furthermore, Congress may “encourage a State to regulate in a 
particular way,” New York, 505 U.S. at 166,—even in areas outside the scope of 
Congress’s Article I, § 8 powers—by “attach[ing] conditions on the receipt of federal 
funds,” South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206-07 (1987).  But, what Congress may not 
do is “regulate state governments’ regulation.”  See New York, 505 U.S. at 166.  Whether 
commanding the use of state machinery to regulate or commanding the nonuse of state 
machinery to regulate, the Supreme Court “has been explicit” that “the Constitution has 
never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the States to govern 
according to Congress’ instructions.”  Id. at 162.   Because that is exactly what PASPA 
does here, I conclude it violates the principles of federalism articulated in New York and 
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Printz.  Therefore, I would reverse the District Court’s order granting summary judgment 
for Plaintiffs and vacate the permanent injunction. 
